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Patent law-and in particular the law governing patent
eligibility-is in a state of crisis. This crisis is one of profound
confusion. Confusion exists because the current approach to
determining patent eligibility confuses the relevant policies
underlying numerous discrete patent law doctrines, and because the
current approach lacks administrability. Ironically, the result of all
this confusion is seemingly clear. The result seems to be that, when
challenged, patent applications and issued patents in certain
technology areas probably do not satisfy the requirement of
eligibility-at least that is the perception. A resulting concern,
therefore, is that the current environment substantially reduces
incentives to invest in research and development. Given this
confusion, lack of administrability, and risk of under-investment in
research and development, the time has come for Congress to amend
the patent statute. In this article, I lay the groundwork for an
analysis of potential amendments to the patent statute by examining
the root causes of the current confusion in this area of patent law.
This groundwork is essential to resolving the present crisis.
INTRODUCTION
Patent law-and in particular the law governing patent
eligibility-is in a state of crisis.' What started as a crisis of
confidence in the patent system 2 has now transformed into a crisis of
confusion in the patent system. The crisis of confidence resulted
from the application of broad patentability standards that allowed
for the issuance and enforcement of numerous patents seen by critics
as undeserving of validity under the law. 3 The crisis of confusion, in
1. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1285 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing) ("It is ... said
that a crisis of patent law and medical innovation may be upon us, and there seems
to be some truth in that concern.").
2. See generally, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS
AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
3. See State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc, 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that patent eligibility was satisfied because a
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turn, has resulted from one of many steps taken by Congress and the
Supreme Court to address the crisis of confidence and these critics:
in particular two of the Supreme Court's most recent decisions
narrowing the scope of patent eligibility.4
No one can reasonably deny that the Supreme Court's decisions
narrowing patent eligibility have had a significant impact on the
patent system. Some have suggested that this impact is positive and
that these decisions will improve the quality of patent applications
and issued patents,5 as well as reduce abusive patent litigation.6 To
the extent these positive results exist, however, they come with
profound confusion.
Confusion exists, first, because the current approach to
determining patent eligibility confuses the relevant policy concerns
underlying numerous discrete patent law doctrines. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's test for eligibility-while derived from its
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as including several implicit (some
would say non-statutory) exceptions-is based on several policy
concerns better addressed by other statutory patent law doctrines.
In particular, the existing doctrines of non-obviousness, written
description, and enablement already address concerns with the
transformation of data by a machine produced "a useful, concrete and tangible
result") (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)),
abrogated by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 659-60 (2010)
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that "the introduction of the 'useful,
concrete, and tangible result' approach to patentability, associated with the Federal
Circuit's State Street decision, preceded the granting of patents that 'ranged from the
somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd"') (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting)).
4. See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative Serys. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99
IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1190 (2014) ("These concerns with the quality of the
specification's disclosure-not just its sufficiency-focus on whether the specification
actually fulfills its teaching function in a manner worthy of the societal quid pro quo
for the patent grant-whether the disclosure is meaningful to its particular art.
Although the Mayo and Myriad Courts did not ground their decisions in those terms,
their dicta concerning the patents' specifications highlight the difference between
specifications that teach a meaningful new way of implementing the claimed
invention and those that simply describe variants on 'well-understood, routine,
conventional activity."') (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298).
6. See, e.g., Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the
Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 82 (2014)
("In Alice Corp v. CLS Bank, the Court further addressed the concern over abusive




breadth of patent claims.7 Likewise, the utility, written description,
and definiteness requirements, as well as the limit on functional
claiming, already address concerns with abstractness and
inadequate disclosure.8 Moreover, concern regarding preemption of
the basic building blocks of human ingenuity-the concern primarily
emphasized in the most recent Supreme Court case on eligibility 9-
ignores the utility, enablement, and written description
requirements, the limited terms of patents, and the existing
experimental use exception.10 Additionally, this concern could be
addressed directly by a more robust experimental use exception to
infringement liability."
Confusion also exists because, beyond confusing relevant policies
and doctrines, the current approach to determining patent eligibility
lacks administrability. It is exceedingly difficult to understand
whether a patent examiner or a court should find subject matter
eligible for patenting given the overarching test for eligibility
7. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 103(a) (non-obviousness), 112(a) (written description and
enablement) (2012).
8. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 112(a) (enablement and written description);
112(b) (definiteness), 112(f) (limitation on functional claiming) (2012).
9. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 ("We have described the concern that drives
this exclusionary principle as one of pre-emption.").
10. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 112(a) (enablement and written description),
154(a)(2) (limited term), 271(e)(1) (experimental use exception) (2012); e.g., Ted
Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information on
Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483, 560 (2006) (describing the existing,
narrow statutory experimental use exception and advocating for a more robust
statutory experimental use exception in part to "avoid inefficient barriers to follow-
on and downstream research efforts").
11. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1086 (1989) (advocating for "a
carefully formulated experimental use exemption from patent infringement
liability"). In the recent Supreme Court eligibility cases, of course, the questions
presented have not expressly identified these other patent law doctrines, and the
Court has not analyzed most of these doctrines despite their clear relevance to the
Court's policy concerns. At most, in Mayo the Court summarily dispensed with the
idea that the other patentability requirements sufficiently address those concerns.
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304
(2012) ("We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the
§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes
overlap. But that need not always be so. And to shift the patent-eligibility inquiry
entirely to these later sections risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty,
while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to do.").
Dmitry Karshtedt has similarly argued that the courts have created a de facto extra-
statutory condition of patentability he calls the "completeness" requirement. See
generally Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C.
L. Rev. 949 (2015).
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articulated by the Supreme Court. That test requires two
increasingly confusing analyses. First, the examiner or judge must
determine whether a patent claim is directed to an ineligible
concept: a law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or an abstract
idea. 12 Second, the examiner or judge must then determine whether
something in the claim transforms the nature of the claim into a
patent-eligible application of the ineligible concept, an analysis
identified as the search for an "inventive concept," one that
"sufficiently ensure[s] that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself."1 3 That two-part test is-to use a term coined by Justice Scalia
with respect to his understanding of another patentability test-
"gobbledygook."' 4 Another way of describing it is-this time using a
phrase coined by Justice Stewart when describing his understanding
of hard-core pornography and thus obscenity-"I know it when I see
it."16 In short, the Supreme Court's test for eligibility provides no
objective guidelines. There are no objective guidelines, in particular,
to help a patent examiner or judge determine what constitutes an
abstract idea or an inventive concept.16
Ironically, while the underlying policy concerns have been
confused and the proper analysis of patent eligibility under the
Supreme Court's recent precedent is confusing, the result of all this
confusion is seemingly clear. The result seems to be that, when
challenged, patent applications and issued patents, at least in
certain technology areas,' 7 probably do not satisfy the requirement
of eligibility. Regardless of whatever analysis the "gobbledygook"
12. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
13. Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
14. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
(No. 04-1350) (criticizing the Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine test as "gobbledygook").
15. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). At
least one district judge has leveled this criticism of the Mayo two-step test for
eligibility in several opinions. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Sony Computer Entm't Am.,
LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1220 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that "the two-step test may
be more like a one step test evocative of Justice Stewart's most famous phrase").
16. For a thorough treatment of the ambiguity of the prohibition on patenting
an abstract idea, see generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of
"an Unpatentable Abstract Idea," 15 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011).
17. These concerns particularly plague biotechnology and software
technologies, but the impact of the Supreme Court's precedent has affected various
other types of technologies. See, e.g., Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 122 Fed.
Cl. 245 (2015) (invalidating claims to "motion-tracking technology for defense and
aerospace applications" based on the Supreme Court's two-part test).
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test actually requires, it gives unfettered access to the smorgasbord
of supporting policies justifying different limits on patentability and
is unconstrained and subjective by nature. At least, that is the
perception. In reality we are not quite to the point where we could
say, as Justice Jackson quipped in the context of U.S. patent law's
discarded "invention" requirement-which, also ironically, the
Supreme Court effectively resurrected in its search for an "inventive
concept"-that "the only patent that is valid is one which [the
Supreme] Court has not been able to get its hands on."18 After all,
the Supreme Court did find for the patent owner on the issue of
eligibility, at least in part, in one of the four cases on point it heard
in the past six years. 19 Application of the Supreme Court's eligibility
test by the lower courts, however, has been more stark. In the first
year after the Supreme Court's last decision on patent eligibility, for
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
invalidated every patent claim challenged as ineligible in twelve of
thirteen opinions on point.20 A resulting concern is that the current
18. Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting). The analogy to Jungerson is particularly apt given the return of the
concept of "invention" in the form of the search for an inventive concept. Compare id.
(complaining that the Supreme Court seemingly invalidated every patent based on
the "invention" requirement) with Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (explaining the
requirement to search for an inventive concept).
19. In the one case where the Court found for the patent owner on the issue of
eligibility, the Court actually split the baby by finding for the patent owner on one
set of claims, and for the challenger on another set of claims. Compare Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (finding
eligibility of one of two sets of claims) with Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593 (finding
ineligibility of all claims); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289 (same); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2347
(same).
20. The opinions reporting holdings of ineligibility include Versata
Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Allvoice
Developments US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 612 Fed. Appx. 1009 (2015); Content
Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); Univ. of Utah Research Found. v Ambry Genetics Corp., 774 F.3d 755
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Planet Bingo, LLC v
VKGS LLC, 576 Fed. Appx. 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v
Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The lone exception is
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Note that
the list of cases does not include other cases during the same year when the Federal
Circuit affirmed ineligibility holdings without issuing opinions. See Dietgoal
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environment substantially reduces incentives to invest in research
and development; if the prevailing perception is that, because of the
eligibility requirement, patents will not be available to protect
inventions, individuals and companies may not invest efficiently in
research and development in affected technology areas.2 1
Given this confusion, lack of administrability, and risk of under-
investment in research and development, the time has come for
Congress to amend the patent statute. In this article, I lay the
groundwork for an analysis of potential amendments to the patent
statute by examining the root causes of the current confusion in this
Innovations LLC v. Bravo Media LLC, 599 Fed. Appx. 956 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Gametek
LLC v. Zynga Inc., 597 Fed. Appx. 644 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Fuzzysharp Technologies Inc.
v. Intel Corporation, 595 Fed. Appx. 996 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
Corp. v. Graff/Ross Holdings, LLP, 604 F. App'x 930 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
21. The contrary argument is that the ineligibility of so many patents actually
encourages individuals and companies to invest more in research and development
because these individuals and companies will bear less risk of liability for patent
infringement. Cf. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE
Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 416 (2014) (describing a "$29 billion tax on
innovation" when "firms ... cho[o]se to innovate and thereby expose[] themselves to
the largely unavoidable risk of [non-practicing entity patent] lawsuit"). Taken to its
extreme, this contrary argument calls into question the very existence of the patent
system itself. Given Congress's decision to use the power granted to it by the
Constitution to create a patent system, however, it is clear that Congress has decided
that the patent system is necessary or at least appropriate to encourage investment
in research and development. Thus, the burden seemingly falls on those who make
the contrary argument-that the patent system retards research and development-
to prove that the patent system should be abolished. And to make a convincing case,
they need more than faith and hope. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual
Property, 62 UCIA L. REV. 1328, 1343-44 (2015) (recognizing arguments in favor of
evidence-based weighing of competing policies in the field of intellectual property
law, but putting the burden on advocates of the patent system to justify it given the
mistaken view that patent rights today are "more and powerful" than they were
"even a few decades ago," when the reality is the Supreme Court has taken
significant steps to weaken patent rights in recent years); see generally, e.g., Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (weakening patent rights by
strengthening the eligibility requirement); Mayo Collaborative Ser's. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (similar weakening of these rights); KSR v.
Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (weakening patent rights by strengthening the
obviousness requirement); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(weakening patent rights by weakening injunctive relief). Regardless, it seems highly
unlikely that Congress will consider abolishing the patent system, and so the more
important point-and the one on which I would expect agreement from both
supporters and critics of the current patent system-is that Congress should fine




area of patent law. This groundwork is essential to resolving the
present crisis. Without a deep understanding of the root causes, any
attempt to amend the patent statute will be a rudderless endeavor
unlikely to eliminate the existing confusion and, ultimately, resolve
the present crisis.
Part I of this article analyzes the origins of the modern patent
statute, including the language governing eligibility currently
present in 35 U.S.C. § 101, identifying several lessons this history
teaches relevant to the eligibility requirement. Part II confronts two
of the most recent Supreme Court decisions on patent eligibility,
decisions that highlight the confusion surrounding this area of the
law and the failure of the Supreme Court to take into account the
lessons taught by the history of the development of the modern
patent statute. Part III explores various aspects of the confusion
that reigns in patent law regarding eligible subject matter, including
confusion over the various requirements of patentability and their
supporting policies. Part IV considers the lack of administrability
inherent in the current two-part test governing the eligibility
requirement. Finally, Part V addresses the impact of the Supreme
Court's approach to eligibility and, in particular, the concern with
reduced incentive to invest in research and development.
I. CODIFYING PATENT ELIGIBILITY
A little history can go a long way toward understanding the
present structure of the patent statute, and an accurate
understanding of the present structure has profound implications for
understanding the current confusion concerning the modern
eligibility requirement.
A. The First Patent Statute
For our purposes, the relevant history began with the Patent Act
of 1790, which created the first federal patent statute after
ratification of the Constitution. 22 The Patent Act of 1790 included
22. The Constitution granted Congress the power to pass legislation to create a
patent system. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass laws "To
promote the Progress of . .. useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ...
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries"). As later explained in the
legislative materials related to the Patent Act of 1952:
This provision was unanimously adopted by the Constitutional Convention
following suggestions for Federal jurisdiction over both patents and
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two separate sections governing what I will call the patentability
and specification requirements, respectively.23
The patentability requirements were concise and simple even
elegant; the relevant section permitted patents to issue for "any
useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any
improvement therein not before known or used." 24 This language
expressed three patentability requirements: (1) a utility requirement
("useful"); a subject matter requirement ("art, manufacture, engine,
machine, or device, or any improvement therein"); and a novelty
requirement ("not before known or used"). 25
The separate specification requirements were much less concise
and simple, and no one in their right mind would call them elegant.
The relevant section included long and halting language describing
exactly what the specification must include, be, and do.2 6 That
language expressed two specification requirements: (1) a written
description requirement; 27 and (2) an enablement requirement. 28
copyrights which had been made in the Convention by James Madison of
Virginia and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina. Each proposed separate
provisions relating to patents and to copyrights which were merged by the
Drafting Committee of the Convention into the general statement we now
have, which was adopted without any dissenting voice.
S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2409. The
Federalist Papers, for their part, include little discussion of this particular power.
James Madison merely explained that the "utility of this power will scarcely be
questioned" and that the "public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of
individuals." THE FEDERALIST, No. 43 (James Madison).
23 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1 & 2, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 100-105).
24. Id. at § 1.
25. Id.
26. Id. at § 2 (requiring "a specification in writing, containing a description,
accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and models (if the nature of the
invention or discovery will admit of a model) of the thing or things, by him or them
invented or discovered, and described as aforesaid, in the said patents; which
specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to
distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but
also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof
it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use
the same").
27. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (requiring "a specification
in writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and
explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a
model) of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered, and described
as aforesaid, in the said patents").
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These patentability requirements (utility, subject matter, and
novelty) and specification requirements (written description and
enablement) have endured in today's patent law. 29 Their expression
in the patent statute and their exact contours, however, have
changed in the intervening years.
B. The Patent Statute Between 1793 and 1952
Importantly, between 1793 and 1952, the patent statute became
increasingly complex, particularly with respect to the patentability
requirements. This complexity, however, developed slowly.
The Patent Act of 1793 did not add much complexity. 30 It
changed the subject matter requirement on the margins by removing
and adding categories. 31 In particular, it added "composition of
matter" and removed "engine" and "device." 32 It also added language
expressing the novelty requirement in terms of the invention being
"new." 3 3 Perhaps the most important change was relatively simple:
the addition of language specifying that the relevant comparison for
determining novelty was whether the invention was known or used
"before the application." 34 Today we might call this an absolute
novelty requirement. Finally, the Act actually simplified the
language describing the specification requirements.3 5 Subsequent
amendments, however, added complexity.
28. Id. (requiring that the "specification shall be so particular, and said models
so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things
before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the
art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest
connected, to make, construct, or use the same").
29. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 112(a) (2012).
30. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
31. Id.
32. See id. (requiring "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the application").
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (requiring "a written
description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding
the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all
other things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, of
which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, compound,
and use the same").
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The Patent Act of 1836 made two significant changes to the
patentability requirements.36 First, it modified the novelty
requirement, effectively codifying the first-to-invent paradigm. In
particular, rather than determine whether the invention was known
or used "before the application," the novelty analysis required
determining whether the invention was known or used "before [the
applicant's or applicants'] discovery or invention thereof." 37 Thus, if
an inventor could show he invented the invention before another
person used the invention in public, he would be entitled to a patent
under the new formulation of the law. In modern terms, we have
called this "swearing behind" potential prior art.38 Second, the Act
limited the ability to swear behind potential prior art by introducing
the concept of what we now call a statutory bar. This statutory bar
prohibited patentability, even if the inventor invented the invention
before the public use or sale of the invention, if the inventor caused
the invention to be in public use or on sale prior to the filing of the
patent application. In the words of the statute, no patent would issue
if the invention was, "at the time of [the applicant's] application for a
patent, in public use or on sale, with his consent or allowance."39 The
specification requirements, by contrast, did not change
significantly. 40
Just three years after the Patent Act of 1836, Congress modified
the patentability requirements again, adding even more
complexity.41 The first change it made was to insert into the statute
what today we call a "prior user right," which, among other things,
gave a party a right to use an invention without paying a patent
36. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
37. Id. In this sense, Congress codified a holding of the Supreme Court in an
opinion by Justice Story. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829) ("What then
is the true meaning of the words 'not known or used before the application?' They
cannot mean that the thing invented was not known or used before the application
by the inventor himself, for that would be to prohibit him from the only means of
obtaining a patent.").
38. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 715 (9th ed., rev. 7, 2015), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s715.html (entitled "Swearing Behind a
Reference").
39. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
40. Id. (requiring "a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the
manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in
such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any
person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same").
41. Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839).
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owner if the party purchased the invention prior to the filing of the
relevant patent application. 42 The next change altered the existing
statutory bar in two ways by introducing what we would call today a
"grace period." For patentability purposes, this grace period allowed
an invention to be in public use or on sale prior to the filing of a
patent application, so long as the inventors filed an application
within two years of the public use or on sale event. 43 Stated
conversely, if the inventors did not file an application within two
years of the public use or on sale event, they would not be entitled to
a patent.44 This change to the law, first, expanded the statutory bar
to public uses and sales of the invention not controlled by the
inventor. This change however, also narrowed the instances in which
the statutory bar would apply by effectively excusing the prior public
use or sale if the inventor filed a patent application within two years
of it. This grace period introduced in 1839 continues to exist in the
patent statute today, although it now excuses public uses or sales
only one year, rather than two years, prior to the application date. 45
Notably, the Patent Act of 1839 also introduced the concept of
abandonment, which would cause a prior public use or sale to spring
back to life, so to speak, and invalidate a patent.46
The complexity of the patent statute increased even more with
the Patent Act of 1870. The Act made three changes to the
patentability requirements. First, the Act combined the statutory
language expressing both the novelty requirement and the statutory
bars from the Patent Act of 1836 with the grace period of the Patent
Act of 1839, resulting in one expression of all three of these
concepts. 47 Second, the Act changed the novelty requirement by
42. Id. ('That every person or corporation who has, or shall have, purchased or
constructed any newly invented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
prior to the application by the inventor or discoverer for a patent, shall be held to
possess the right to use, and vend to others to be used, the specific machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter so made or purchased, without liability
therefor to the inventor, or any other person interested in such invention.").
43. Id. ("[N]o patent shall be held to be invalid by reason of such purchase, sale,
or use prior to the application for a patent as aforesaid, except on proof of
abandonment of such invention to the public; or that such purchase, sale, or prior use
has been for more than two years prior to such application for a patent.")
44. Id.
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
46. See , ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353 (1839) ("[N]o patent shall be held to be invalid
by reason of such purchase, sale, or use prior to the application for a patent as
aforesaid, except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public.").
47. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (allowing patents to
"any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
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adding a geographic restriction to the prohibition on obtaining a
patent if the invention was "known or used before his or their
discovery or invention thereof;" such that this prohibition applied
only if it was known or used "in this country." 48 Third, the Act
changed the novelty requirement by adding a prohibition on
obtaining a patent if the invention was "patented, or described in
any printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his
invention or discovery thereof." 49 The Patent Act of 1870 also
changed the specification requirements in two important respects.
First, it added the best mode requirement.5 0 Second, it added a
claiming requirement, which included what is now known as the
definiteness requirement.5 '
The next major patent legislation, the Patent Act of 1897, did not
make significant changes to the patentability requirements. 52The
complexity of its single provision governing the patentability
requirements, however, was extreme:
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvements thereof, not known or
used by others in this country, before his invention or
discovery thereof, and not patented or described in any
printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his
invention or discovery thereof, or more than two years prior
to his application, and not in public use or on sale in this
country for more than two years prior to his application,
unless the same is proved to have been abandoned, may,
new and useful improvement thereof, not known or used by others in this country,
and not patented, or described in any printed publication in this or any foreign
country, before his invention or discovery thereof, and not in public use or on sale for




50. Id. § 26 (requiring "a written description of the same, and of the manner
and process of making, constructing, compounding, and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which
it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct,
compound, and use the same; and in case of a machine, he shall explain the principle
thereof, and the best mode in which he has contemplated applying that principle so
as to distinguish it from other inventions").
51. Id. ("[H]e shall particularly point out and distinctly claim the part,
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or discovery.").
52. Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (1897).
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upon payment of the fees required by law, and other due
proceeding had, obtain a patent therefor.5 3
All of the patentability requirements and their qualifications were
expressed in this one sentence. This sentence described subject
matter, utility, novelty, the statutory bar, geographic restrictions,
the grace period, and abandonment. It is no wonder, then, that later
drafters would separate the patentability requirements into more
than one section of the patent statute.5 4
C. The Modern Patent Statute
The modern patent statute-at least its organization into its
present sections-began with the Patent Act of 1952. The Act itself
was part of a "comprehensive program of revising and enacting into
law all of the titles of the United States Code."5 5 As part of that
comprehensive program, the drafters did at least three important
things with respect to the patentability requirements 56 in particular.
First, they separated the utility and subject matter requirements
from the novelty requirement and statutory bars: they placed the
former in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the latter in 35 U.S.C. § 102.57 This
53. Id.
54. In 1903, for example, Congress provided that
[n]o person otherwise entitled thereto shall be debarred from receiving a
patent for his invention or discovery, nor shall any patent be declared
invalid by reason of its having been first patented or caused to be patented
by the inventor or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country,
unless the application for said foreign patent was filed more than twelve
months . . . prior to the filing of the application in this country, in which
case no patent shall be granted in this country.
Patent Act of 1903, ch. 1019, § 1, 32 Stat. 1225 (1903). This created an additional
statutory bar related to the filing of patent applications in foreign countries. An
inventor would be barred from obtaining a U.S. patent if she did not file her
application in the United States within one year of filing a foreign patent
application. Congress placed this statutory bar in a separate statutory section as
compared to all of the other patentability requirements. Id.
55. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 1 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2395. The House Report duplicates the relevant text from the Senate Report. Thus, I
will cite only to the Senate Report.
56. The "patentability requirements" include the utility, subject matter,
novelty, statutory bars, and non-obviousness requirements.
57. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--(a)
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simplified the complex language from the Patent Act of 1897,
resulting in a pared-down statutory section-35 U.S.C. § 101-that
expressed only two patentability requirements: (1) the utility
requirement; and (2) the subject matter requirement.58 Together, I
refer to these two requirements as the "eligibility requirement."
Second, they amended the subject matter requirement by replacing
the category of "art" with "process."5 9 Third, they "codified" the
common law doctrine of "invention," actually replacing it with a
statutory requirement of non-obviousness in 35 U.S.C. § 103.60
With respect to the specification requirements, 61 the Patent Act
of 1952 placed all of them in one new statutory section. The Act
described the written description, enablement, and best mode
requirements in a first paragraph of § 112, and the claiming and
the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described
in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent,
or (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States, or (c) he has abandoned
the invention, or (d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the
applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date
of the application for patent in this country on an application filed more than twelve
months before the filing of the application in the United States, or (e) the invention
was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the
United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (f) he did
not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or (g) before the
applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who
had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention
there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to
practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to
conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.").
58. Id. (codified as amended at § 101) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.").
59. Id. They also explained what "process" meant in § 100: "The term 'process'
means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material." Id. (codified as amended at § 100).
60. Id. (codified as amended at § 103 ("A patent may not be obtained though the
invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.").
61. The "specification requirements" include the enablement, written
description, best mode, claiming, definiteness, and functional claiming requirements.
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definiteness requirement in a second paragraph of § 112.62 It also
created a new provision in a third paragraph related to functional
claiming.63
While the Senate and House Reports accompanying the Patent
Act of 1952 say little with respect to the specification requirements,
they include important descriptions of the patentability
requirements in the new statute and their relationship with one
another. In the following excerpt, for example, the drafters identify
the role of § 101, as well as its relationship to the other sections of
the statute:
Referring first to section 101, this section specifies the type
of material which can be the subject matter of a patent....
Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be
patented, "subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." The conditions under which a patent may be obtained
follow, and section 102 covers the conditions relating to
novelty.
A person may have "invented" a machine or a manufacture,
which may include anything under the sun that is made by
man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 101
unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled. 64
In this way, the Senate and House Reports explain that § 101
specifies or sets forth the "type of material which can be the subject
matter of a patent," or, in other words, the "subject matter that can
be patented."65 Here, the Reports also clarify that § 101 merely
identifies the subject matter that "can be patented," but for a patent
to issue the application must satisfy the other conditions and
requirements of Title 35 which "follow," such as § 102.66 Thus, for
example, a machine or manufacture "is not necessarily patentable
under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled."6 7
That is, for a patent to be issued, the inventor must comply not only
62. Id. (codified as amended at § 112).
63. Id.







with the patentability requirements of § 101, but also with the
patentability requirements of §§ 102 and 103.
Besides identifying the role of § 101 and its relationship to the
other sections of the statute, the Senate and House report also
address the decision to replace the category of "art" with "process" in
§ 101.68 With respect to this change in statutory language, the
drafters explained that "the word 'art' as used in this place means
'process or method."' 6 9 The legislative history also describes the
additional sections expressing the other patentability requirements:
Section 102, in general, may be said to describe the statutory
novelty required for patentability, and includes, in effect, an
amplification and definition of "new" in section 101.
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a
condition which exists in the law and has existed for more
than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts.
An invention which has been made, and which is new in the
sense that the same thing has not been made before, may
still not be patentable if the difference between the new
thing and what was known before is not considered
sufficiently great to warrant a patent.70
These other patentability requirements exist in §§ 102 and 103.
Importantly, the drafters explained that while § 101 would still
include the word "new," § 102 provides "in effect, an amplification
and definition of 'new' in section 101."71 Thus, § 102, in general, may
be said to describe the statutory novelty required for patentability. 72
Section 102 also described statutory bars.73 Finally, § 103 described
the last patentability requirement showing that even a novel
68. Id.
69. Id. ("[T]he word 'art' which appears in the present statute has been changed
to the word 'process.' 'Art' in this place in the present statute has a different meaning
than the words 'useful art' in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use
of the word 'art' in other places in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to
be practically synonymous with process or method. The word 'process' has been used
to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word 'art' as used in this place means
'process or method,' and that it does not mean the same thing as the word 'art' in
other places.").
70. Id. at 6 (as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394 at 2399).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102).
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invention "may still not be patentable if the difference between the
new thing and what was known before is not considered sufficiently
great to warrant a patent."74
Since 1952, the most important patent legislation has been the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act ("America Invents Act") of 2011.75
While the America Invents Act substantially changed aspects of the
patent statute-including the novelty requirement of § 102 by
replacing the first-to-invent paradigm with a first-inventor-to-file
paradigm 7 6-it did not change the organization of the patent statute
generally, or § 101, in particular.7 7 Thus, the patentability
requirements remain expressed in §§ 101 (utility and subject
matter), 102 (novelty and statutory bars), and 103 (non-
obviousness).7 8 Likewise, the specification requirements remain
expressed in § 112(a) (written description, enablement, and best
mode), 112(b) (claiming, definiteness), and 112(f) (functional
claiming). 79
D. Lessons About Eligibility Law
To a Federal Circuit judge or a patent law professor or
practitioner, this brief summary of the history of the patent statute
may be known. But there are several important lessons this history
teaches.
74. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399.
75. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
76. Among the patentability requirements, the most substantial change made
by the America Invents Act was the modification of § 102 to return U.S. patent law to
a type of first-to-file rather than a first-to-invent paradigm while preserving the one-
year grace period for certain events. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the
Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B. J. 435, 449
(2012) (describing the revised version of § 102). In reality, however, given the
statutory language, the America Invents Act introduced what I like to call a "first-
inventor-to-file-or-publicly-disclose-without-abandoning" paradigm. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)(1)(B), 102(b)(2)(B) (providing protection for the first to publicly disclose);
§ 102(a)(2) (requiring at least publication of a filed patent application, and therefore
no abandonment until at least publication, for that application to qualify as prior
art).
77. The America Invents Act did add a note to § 101, stating that,
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim
directed to or encompassing a human organism." America Invents Act § 34, 125 Stat.
at 340.
78. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2012).
79. Id. § 112.
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First, this history teaches that § 101 does not state all of the
patentability requirements. The present patent statute includes
other sections identifying patentability requirements-§§ 102 and
103 in particular. While all of the patentability requirements at one
time existed in one section,80 the original, elegant language became
bloated.8 1 Thus, the Patent Act of 1952 separated the patentability
requirements into multiple sections of the patent statute.82 This is
important because it means that § 101 alone does not need to do all
of the work necessary to eliminate patentability for unworthy
claims. Therefore, there is no need to twist the language of § 101 for
policy reasons to ensure that unmeritorious inventions are not
patentable, at least without considering all of the patentability
requirements, including those outside of § 101. If § 101 does not
render an invention unpatentable, the patentability requirements of
§§ 102 and 103 still remain. Likewise, there is no valid basis for an
analysis of the constitutionality of a particular interpretation or
version of § 101 divorced from the remainder of the patent statute.
The various sections of the patent statute work together to ensure
that only worthy inventors obtain patents.88
80. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (permitting patents to issue
for "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein not before known or used").
81. The Patent Act of 1897 included a single provision governing the
patentability requirements:
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvements thereof, not known or used by others in this country, before
his invention or discovery thereof, and not patented or described in any
printed publication in this or any foreign country, before his invention or
discovery thereof, or more than two years prior to his application, and not
in public use or on sale in this country for more than two years prior to his
application, unless the same is proved to have been abandoned, may, upon
payment of the fees required by law, and other due proceeding had, obtain
a patent therefor.
Patent Act of 1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (1897). In this one sentence resided all
of the patentability requirements and their qualifications: subject matter, utility,
novelty, the statutory bar, geographic restrictions, the grace period, and
abandonment. It is no wonder, then, that later drafters would separate the
patentability requirements into more than one section of the patent statute. See
Patent Act of 1903, ch. 1019, § 1, 32 Stat. 1225 (1903).
82. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03).
83. Thus, the Supreme Court is wrong to the extent it believes that the
patentability requirements expressed in § 101-what collectively I call the eligibility
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Second, this history teaches that "new" in § 101 is redundant.
Section 102 defines the requirement of newness in terms of
comparing the claimed invention with prior art. The legislative
history to the Patent Act of 1952 makes this clear. It explains that
"[s]ection 102, in general, may be said to describe the statutory
novelty required for patentability, and includes, in effect, an
amplification and definition of 'new' in section 101."84 This is
important because it highlights that "newness" or novelty of a claim,
when comparing that claim to prior art at least, is not a relevant
concern of any independent patentability requirement remaining in
§ 101.85
Third, this history teaches that the "invention" requirement is
not part of § 101. The Patent Act of 1952 replaced the common law
"invention" requirement with the statutory non-obviousness
requirement of § 103.86 And if the history of the statutory
amendments did not make this clear, one of the drafters of the
Patent Act of 1952 did make this clear in his writings on point, as I
will show.87 Regardless, this replacement is important because it
shows that it is not a relevant concern of any independent
patentability requirement in § 101 to consider how similar the
claimed invention is to the prior art. It is the role of § 103 to ensure
requirement-are the only bars to patentability. It is therefore wrong to the extent
it, as a result of this misunderstanding, develops common law tests that are based on
policies untied to the statutory text of § 101, that are superfluous, or that, worse,
conflict with the remaining patentability requirements of §§ 102 and 103. See, e.g.,
infra Part III.B.2.
84. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399. Beyond novelty, § 102 also sets forth the law governing what traditionally were
known as statutory bars. See Daniel Taskalos, Metallizing Engineering's Forfeiture
Doctrine After the America Invents Act, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 657, 661 (2013)
("Although the AIA completely redrafts the language of the novelty provision, it
maintains the same categories of available prior art references contained in the
statutory bars subsection of the novelty provision.").
85. The Supreme Court shows its failure to understand this point-that
"newness"' or novelty of a claim, when comparing that claim to prior art at least, is
not a relevant concern of any independent patentability requirement remaining in §
101-when it discounts existing or conventional acts in the context of its eligibility
analysis. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357-58, 2359 (2014);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 1298
(2012). I discuss this point in more detail infra text accompanying note 113.
86. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §103).




that "the difference between the new thing and what was known
before" is "sufficiently great to warrant a patent."88
Judge Giles Rich's writings make this last point clear. Judge
Rich was an authority on this point because, prior to becoming a
judge, he and P.J. Federico, the Patent Office's Examiner-in-Chief,
drafted the new patent statute enacted in 1952.89 Importantly,
Judge Rich repeatedly explained how § 103 replaced the common-
law "invention" requirement, for example, explaining that it was the
very intention of the drafters of the Patent Act of 1952 to eliminate
the "invention" requirement:
Nowhere in the entire act is there any reference to a
requirement of "invention" and the drafters did this
deliberately in an effort to free the law and lawyers from
bondage to that old and meaningless term. The word
"invention" is used in the statute only to refer to the thing
invented. That is why the requirement of "invention" should
be referred to, if at all, only with respect due to that which is
dead.90
In other words, not only is there no "invention" requirement in § 101,
there is no longer any invention requirement anywhere in the
common law or in the patent statute. Congress replaced the
"invention" requirement with the statutory non-obviousness
requirement, as Judge Rich explained:
Upon examination in the Patent Office or upon adjudication
in court, under the statute, when novelty, utility, and
[non]obviousness as defined in section 103 are found to exist,
and provided there is no one-year statutory bar, then there
is patentability and that is the end of the matter. An
examination for the presence or absence of "invention," or
adherence to precedents on that muddy issue, is not called
for and is not proper. It is a work of supererogation. It
88. Id.
89. Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990,
1008 (2013) ("The 1952 Patent Act was co-drafted by then-Examiner-in-Chief and
Patent Office Board of Appeals member Pasquale J. (Pat) Federico and then-patent
attorney and future C.C.P.A. and Federal Circuit Judge Giles Sutherland Rich.").
90. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 405
(1960), reprinted in 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 135, 145 (2004).
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illustrates, furthermore, a failure to grasp the meaning of
the statutory provisions.9 1
Given this explanation, it is clear that any insistence on the search
for an "invention" after 1952 reflects a failure to understand the
meaning of the new patent statute. The reality is that § 101 does not
express any "invention" requirement. 9 2
Fourth, the legislative history clearly explains that § 101
specifies or sets forth the "type of material which can be the subject
matter of a patent," or in other words the "subject matter that can be
patented." 93 The legislative history says nothing concerning claim
breadth with respect to § 101.9
In stark contrast with all of these lessons stands the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on the issue of patent eligibility, decisions
that reflect, and have caused, considerable confusion. We now turn
to those decisions and the confusion they have created.
II. UNRAVELING PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Two of the most recent Supreme Court decisions on patent
eligibility highlight the confusion surrounding this area of the law,
as well as the failure of the Supreme Court to take into account the
lessons taught by the history of the development of the modern
patent statute. As I will show, these decisions in particular reflect
confusion regarding the organization of the patent statute and the
policies underlying various patent law doctrines, including, not just
the eligibility requirement, but all of the patentability and
specification requirements.
A. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.
The earlier of the two cases is Mayo Collaborative Services v.
91. Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Sec. 103 of
the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'y 855, 866 (1964).
92. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court shows its failure to understand this
basic point when it invokes a search for an inventive concept in the context of its
analysis of eligibility. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. I
discuss this problem in more detail. See infra text accompanying notes 365 and 397-
407.
93. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399.
94. Id. In short, the Supreme Court and commentators are wrong to suggest
that the primary concern of § 101 is reigning in claims that are too broad. I discuss
this problem in more detail. See infra Part III.B.
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Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.95 In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the
Court focused on a common law "implicit exception" to patent
eligibility for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.96 The Court explained that the concern underlying this
exception is impeding innovation by creating exclusive rights in the
basic tools of scientific and technological work.9 7 And while the
application of a law of nature may be eligible, the Court explained
that "one must do more than simply state the law of nature while
adding the words 'apply it."'98
The Mayo Court concluded that the claimed processes at issue in
the case did not transform unpatentable natural laws into patent-
eligible applications of those laws.99 The important part of the
decision is the Court's explanation of why. One might think, based
on the Court's discussion to this point, that the Court would explain
that the claim simply did not describe how to apply the relevant
natural law. But the claim at issue did so.100 Thus, to reach its
conclusion that the claim was invalid, instead the Court explained
that what was missing was an inventive concept sufficient to ensure
that the claim amounts to "significantly more" than a claim upon a
natural law itself.1 01
The Court additionally explained that the claim at issue in the
case set forth a law of nature, namely the relationships between
metabolites in human blood and the effectiveness or harmfulness of
a drug.102 The Mayo Court then walked through each of the elements
of the claim and pointed out that each was either the law of nature
itself or old steps.1 03 It also concluded that the combination of these
elements added nothing to each individual step. 104 In other words,
apart from the natural law itself, all the claimed process involved
95. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
96. Id. at 1293.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1294.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1295 (quoting claim 1 of the patent-in-suit, which described how to
administer a drug to a subject, determine a level of the relevant metabolites in the
blood of the subject, and based on the level to determine the need to increase or
decrease administration of the drug).
101. Id. at 1297-99.
102. Id. at 1294, 1296.
103. Id. at 1297-98. According to the Court, the wherein clauses described the
law of nature itself and the administering and determining elements merely
described old steps. Id.
104. Id. at 1298.
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was "well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field, which according to the Court
was insufficient to show eligibility." 0 5 Furthermore, according to the
Court, granting a patent on this claim would risk tying up the use of
the underlying natural law, inhibiting its use in making further
discoveries. 0 6
The Supreme Court faulted the Federal Circuit for using what
was known as the "machine or transformation" test to determine
patent eligibility. 107 The Court further faulted the Federal Circuit's
finding that the claims at issue met the transformation part of that
test. 0 8 The Court then rejected several other arguments. One
important argument rejected by the Court was the government's
view that § 101 should be easy to meet and that other statutory
provisions-§§ 102, 103, and 112-should do the necessary screening
of claims.1 09 The Court rejected this position out of hand, saying that
its prior cases were not consistent with the government's view.1 10
To say that the Supreme Court's understanding of patent
eligibility in Mayo was shocking to patent law professors and
practitioners would be a gross understatement. To start, it directly
contradicts the four lessons described above that are taught by the
legislative history of § 101. First, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the idea that § 101 should not duplicate the patentability
requirements in the other statutory provisions.1 1 ' The Court
indicated its view that the patentability requirements in § 101
should alone bar patentability, and as a result, it developed a
common law test based on policies untied to the statutory text of
§ 101 and conflicting or superfluous compared to the remaining
statutory text of §§ 102 and 103.112 Second, by discounting existing
105. Id. at 1294.
106. Id. at 1301.
107. Id. at 1296, 1302-03.
108. Id. at 1303.
109. Id. at 1303-04.
110. Id. at 1303.
111. Id. at 1304 ("We recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional
steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might
sometimes overlap. But that need not always be so. And to shift the patent-eligibility
inquiry entirely to these later sections risks creating significantly greater legal
uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not
equipped to do.").
112. Id. at 1304-05.
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or conventional acts in the context of its analysis of eligibility, 113 the
Court showed its failure to understand that novelty with respect to
prior art is not a relevant concern of § 101. Third, the Court, when it
invoked a search for an inventive concept, 114 showed its failure to
understand that Congress eliminated any search for inventiveness
in favor of a requirement of non-obviousness articulated in § 103.
Fourth, by stating that the claim was "overly broad,"1 15 the Court
highlighted its failure to understand that § 101 is not concerned with
the breadth of claims.
Moreover, the decision shocked knowledgeable observers because
it directly contradicted Supreme Court precedent directly on point.
In Mayo, the Court condoned analyzing the novelty of individual
steps of the claimed process-indeed, the Court separately analyzed
each step of the claimed process and discounted steps that were
"well known in the art." 116 The Court, for example, discounted one
particular step in the claimed process because it simply "tells doctors
to engage in well-understood, routine, conventional activity
previously engaged in by scientists who work in the field."11 7 But the
Court in Diamond v. Diehr had previously said not to do this exact
thing: "The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of
the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter."118
Beyond this clear contradiction of its own precedent, the
Supreme Court has also relied upon a misinterpretation of English
113. Id. at 1298 ("[T]his step tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work in the field.
Purely 'conventional or obvious' '[pre]-solution activity' is normally not sufficient to
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a
law.") (second alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978)).
114. Id. at 1294 (stating that its previous cases "insist that a process that focuses
upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of
elements, sometimes referred to as an 'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural
law itself') (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 594).
115. Id. at 1301.
116. Id. at 1297-98.
117. Id.
118. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981). Older Supreme Court
precedent similarly does not support considering the novelty of a claimed invention
to determine eligibility. Flook, 437 U.S. at 591-92 ("[T]he novelty of the
mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.").
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precedent, Neilson v. Harford,119 as shown recently by Jeffrey
Lefstin.120 The Court in Mayo explained that the invention in
Neilson was eligible for patenting because "the claimed process did
more than simply instruct users to use the principle that hot air
promotes ignition better than cold air, since it explained how the
principle could be implemented in an inventive way."1 2 1
Furthermore, the Mayo Court explained that "the claimed process
[in Neilson] included not only a law of nature but also several
unconventional steps." 122 As Lefstin has shown, however, this is
incorrect; it is exactly the opposite of the actual test applied in
Neilson.123 The invention in Neilson was eligible for patenting, not
because it disclosed anything "inventive" or "unconventional," but
instead, because it disclosed a mere practical application of a natural
law or phenomena. 124
On top of these contradictions with the legislative history and
case law regarding the eligibility requirement, the test the Supreme
Court articulated provides no guidance. Instead it incorporates a
purely subjective standard, the correct application of which cannot
be predicted with any certainty. Indeed, the Mayo Court's own
articulation of the test it put in place highlighted the lack of
certainty it was creating: "[T]o transform an unpatentable law of
119. THOMAS WEBSTER, REPORTS AND NOTES OF CASES ON LETTERS PATENT FOR
INVENTION, 371 (1844) (reporting the June 26, 1841 opinion of the English court in
support of its judgment in Neilson v. Harford).
120. See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 565 (2015).
121. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1300 (emphasis added).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Lefstin, supra note 120, at 565.
124. See id. at 570. As explained by Lefstin:
In both England and the United States, Neilson established the line
between principles in the abstract, which were not patent eligible, and
practical applications of principles, which were. That understanding was
carried forward through the early twentieth century in the United States,
where it became black-letter law that nearly every practical application of
a fundamental principle might properly be the subject of a patent. It was
not until 1948, when the Supreme Court decided Funk Brothers Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., that a test of inventive application entered the
mainstream of American patent law.
Id. According to Lefstin, in Neilson the court reached its conclusion "not because [the
inventor's] application was inventive, but because his application was entirely
conventional." Id. at 586.
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nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do
more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words
'apply it."'125 Likewise, the Court stated that "a process that focuses
upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other elements or a
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 'inventive
concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself."1 26
What does all of this mean? Something "more" than simply
stating "apply the natural law" is required, and that missing
something is an inventive concept.1 27 But what is an inventive
concept? The Court never explains, other than to say what it is not:
it is not limiting the use of a natural law to a particular
technological environment; 128 it is not adding insignificant
postsolution activity; 129 and it is not "well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the
field."130 Thus, no affirmative explanation is given. In terms of
highlighting the confusion it created, it is telling that when the
Court characterized one of its precedents as involving an inventive
concept, the Court did not even explain why that precedent included
an inventive concept, other than to repeat the use of the word
"inventive."131
Given all of these problems with Mayo, it is not surprising to see
the author of a prominent patent law blog state that Mayo is one of
the worst opinions the Supreme Court has ever issued in patent
law. 132 Other prominent practitioners have had similarly negative
reactions to Mayo.133
125. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1297.
129. Id. at 1298.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1299 ("These other steps apparently added to the formula something
that in terms of patent law's objectives had significance-they transformed the
process into an inventive application of the formula.").
132. Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v.
Prometheus, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/
supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheusid=22920.
133. See, e.g., Donald R. Dunner, 2014 Friedman Appellate Advocacy Lecture, 24
FED. CIR. B.J. 381, 384-85 (2015) ("On the § 101 front, the Supreme Court has
replaced the machine-or-transformation test with a number of unhelpful
guidelines.. . . [W]holly aside from the fact that focusing on an additional 'inventive
concept' is a backward step from the goal of predictability, it unfortunately conflates
the mission of § 101 with the other, patentability-oriented statutory provisions.").
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B. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l
The latter of the two Supreme Court cases highlighting confusion
surrounding patent eligibility is Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International.13 4 In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme
Court effectively doubled-down on the test introduced in Mayo,
explaining that the same test protected not just laws of nature, but
also abstract ideas from being patented.135 The Court explained that
it sought to balance the policy of preventing preemption of the basic
tools of scientific and technological work with the idea that, at some
level, all inventions embody or use laws of nature and abstract
ideas. 136 Ultimately, the Alice Court stated that an invention is not
ruled ineligible merely because it involves an abstract concept;
"applications of such concepts 'to a new and useful end,"' the Court
said, "remain eligible for patent protection."1 37 Rather than focus on
whether the claim actually identifies an application of an abstract
idea, however, the Court focused on the analysis used in Mayo. What
is important, according to the Alice Court, is to distinguish between
basic "building blocks" and inventions that integrate them into
"something more."138
The framework the Court identified is a generalized version of
the one introduced in Mayo, divided into two steps. First, determine
whether the claims are directed to one of the patent-ineligible
concepts, and, second, if so, ask what else is in the claims, to see
whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claims
into patent-eligible applications. 13 9 The Court highlighted-again
drawing from Mayo-that that this second part of the test is the
search for an inventive concept-an element of a claim that ensures
that the claim in practice amounts to "significantly more" than a
claim on the concept itself.140
Applying this two-part test to the particular invention at issue in
Alice, the Court first concluded that the claims were directed to an
"abstract idea of intermediated settlement." 14 1 Apparently this was
134. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
135. Id. at 2354-55.
136. Id. at 2354.
137. Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
138. Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1303 (2012)).
139. Id. at 2355.




so because the claims were addressed to a fundamental economic
practice long prevalent in commerce, and because that longstanding
practice, intermediated settlement, is a "building block of the
modern economy." 142 The Court, however, did not limit its conception
of an abstract idea to "preexisting, fundamental truths." 143 Second,
the Court concluded that the claims did not add enough to transform
the abstract idea into a patent eligible invention.144 The claims
apparently included no inventive concept. 145 In particular, the mere
addition of a generic computer was insufficient. 146 In this regard, the
Court analyzed past precedent, concluding that solving a
technological problem qualifies an invention as eligible for
patenting. 147 The improvement of an existing technological process
qualifies as a patent eligible invention, said the Court, and not just
because of the use of a computer.148 The Court explained that "[t]he
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-
ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention."149
Apparently, well understood routine use of a computer was not
enough to transform the abstract idea into a patent eligible
invention, and instead, what the Court sought was an "inventive
use" of a computer.150 The Court noted that the invention at issue in
the case did not improve any other technology or improve the
functioning of the computer itself.15 '
Alice only furthered the confusion surrounding patent eligibility
by adopting the reasoning and test set forth in Mayo, and applying it
beyond the common law exception for natural laws to the common
law exception for abstract ideas. Thus, Alice both perpetuated and
extended the contradiction of the lessons taught by the legislative
history of § 101, the inconsistency with prior Supreme Court and
English precedent, and ultimately, the purely subjective approach to
eligibility that provides no guidance to those making decisions
whether to invest in research and development.
142. Id. at 2356.
143. Id. at 2356-57 (internal citations omitted).
144. Id. at 2357.
145. Id.
146. Id.








In Mayo and Alice, the Supreme Court has (1) confused the
relevant policies underlying patent eligibility as compared to other
patent law doctrines; and (2) created a confusing test governing
patent eligibility. I address these two areas of confusion in turn.
However, I first address a preliminary foundational problem:
confusion over what are the very requirements of patentability-
highlighted, interestingly enough, by a common phrase used to
describe the doctrine of eligibility, "patentable subject matter."152
A. The Requirements of Patentability
It is important at the beginning to clearly label the doctrine
under consideration. This doctrine has been known as the
requirement of "patentable subject matter," 153 but that terminology
is, at a minimum, confusing and, at worst, inaccurate. 154 Use of the
phrase "patentable subject matter" may lead some to believe that if
this doctrine is satisfied-if there is patentable subject matter-then
the applicant is entitled to a patent. That is wrong.
"Patentable subject matter" refers to a patentability requirement
that, not surprisingly, relates to subject matter. Importantly,
however, when an applicant meets the requirement of "patentable
subject matter," there are other patentability requirements that also
152. I use the phrase "patentability requirements" to encompass the eligibility
requirement as well as the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. The patent
statute labels the requirements of §§ 102 and 103 in particular as "conditions for
patentability." 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 ("Conditions for patentability; novelty") & 103
("Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter") (2012).
153. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1293 (2012) ("Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject
matter."); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("The district court granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the patent
does not claim patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit A Run for Its Money: Challenging Patents in the
PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 256 (2015) (stating that "the [Supreme] Court
rejected the Federal Circuit's view that any invention that produces a useful,
concrete, and tangible result is drawn to patentable subject matter").
154. It does not help matters that the official title of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
"Inventions patentable." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The legislative history explains that
"[t]he corresponding section of [the] existing statute [was] split into two sections,
section 101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be obtained, and
section 102 defining statutory novelty and stating other conditions for patentability."
S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2409.
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must be met before the applicant is entitled to a patent. "Patentable
subject matter" should therefore not be confused with patentability.
To be patentable, a claim must meet every requirement of
patentability, not just the requirement related to subject matter.
Thus, were we to stick with the rather confusing phrase of
"patentable subject matter," we would need to describe novelty as
"patentable novelty" and non-obviousness as "patentable non-
obviousness." There, however, is no difference between "novelty" and
"patentable novelty," or between "non-obviousness" and "patentable
non-obviousness."
A less confusing and more accurate label is the "subject matter
requirement" or "eligible subject matter." 15 5 Saying that subject
matter is "eligible" for patenting more clearly and accurately
highlights the existence of additional patentability requirements. In
other words, for eligible subject matter to issue in a patent, that
eligible subject matter must meet the additional patentability
requirements. Those additional patentability requirements include
utility,1 5 6 novelty and statutory bars,1 57 and non-obviousness.1 58 In
the patent statute, the additional patentability requirements of
novelty, statutory bars, and non-obviousness are called "conditions
for patentability."15 9
This distinction between "patentable subject matter" (wrongly
understood) and "eligible subject matter" is important. If one
inaccurately thinks that the "patentable subject matter"
requirement is all that stands between a patent application and an
issued patent, then there is good reason to interpret the requirement
creatively to add to the doctrine. But if one correctly understands
that the requirement is concerned only with "eligibility" and that
there is an assortment of other statutory grounds or "policy levers"160
available to prevent patents from issuing to unworthy applicants,
155. Note that I do not say "eligibility." In my view, both the subject matter
requirement and the utility requirement should be considered together to form the
eligibility requirement.
156. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
157. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
159. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 ("Conditions for patentability; novelty") & 103 ("Conditions
for patentability; non-obvious subject matter") (2012).
160. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1671-75 (2003).
2016]1 187
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
then there is no basis to interpret the requirement creatively to add
non-statutory constraints.161
This underlying distinction between "patentable subject matter"
(wrongly understood) and "eligible subject matter" is consistent with
one explanation of why the Supreme Court has so badly
misinterpreted § 101. The Supreme Court has treated the doctrine
as if it were the only barrier to a patent applicant obtaining a
patent. This confusion, however, may have less to do with
nomenclature than the history of § 101. As described above,
Congress created § 101 in 1952 when it recodified the patent
statute.1 62 The creation of Title 35 was the result of an effort to
create one new statute, with better articulation and organization of
the governing law. 163 With respect to § 101, in particular, the
drafters of the new statute explained that "[tihe corresponding
section of [the] existing statute [was] split into two sections, section
101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be
obtained, and section 102 defining statutory novelty and stating
other conditions for patentability." 64 Likewise, the drafters created
another separate section, § 103, to govern the non-obviousness
condition for patentability. 165 The Supreme Court, however, has
been interpreting § 101 creatively, as if it were the only barrier to
patentability, and in the process conflating eligibility in § 101 with
the concepts of novelty and non-obviousness from §§ 102 and 103.
B. Claim Breadth
Beyond confusion regarding the patentability requirements,
confusion exists because the current approach to patent eligibility
confuses the relevant policy concerns underlying numerous discrete
patent law doctrines. Consider the first major concern reflected in
the Supreme Court's recent decisions on patent eligibility: the
breadth of patent claims. 66 Other statutory patent doctrines already
161. The Supreme Court may view its decisions on § 101 as the only basis to
eliminate bad patents. Indeed, Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit has expressed this
view. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer,
J., dissenting).
162. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 1 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2395.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2409.
165. Id. at 2399.
166. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
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address this concern, and they do so with more precision, guidance,
and authority than the Supreme Court's law of patent eligibility.
1. The Supreme Court's Underlying Concerns
In its eligibility cases, the Supreme Court has articulated several
concerns related to the scope of patent claims. The Court, for
example, has indicated a generalized concern with the breadth of
claims. In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court characterized the
claims at issue as "broad examples of how hedging can be used in
commodities and energy markets."1 67 In Mayo v. Prometheus, the
Court went further, complaining that the claims at issue were
"overly broad."1 68
The Court has more clearly identified its concern with the
breadth of claims. For example, it has focused on whether the claims
cover old activities. In Bilski, the Court faulted the claims at issue
for covering hedging because "'[h]edging is a fundamental economic
practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any
introductory finance class."'1 69 Likewise, in Mayo, the Court faulted
claimed processes because "the steps in the claimed processes (apart
from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the
field." 70 And in Alice, the Court pointed out that the claims covered
"computer functions [that] are 'well-understood, routine,
conventional activit[ies]' previously known to the industry."171
At other times, the Supreme Court has stated that its concern
with broad claims is that they preempt the basic building blocks of
human ingenuity. In Bilski, for example, the Court explained that
"[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of
this approach in all fields."1 7 2 Similiarly, in Mayo, the Court
characterized its cases as "warn[ing] us against upholding patents
that claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a natural
167. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (indicating concern that
"Petitioners' remaining claims are broad examples of how hedging can be used in
commodities and energy markets").
168. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
169. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (faulting claims for "explain[ing] the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk") (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 545 F.3d 943, 1013
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting)).
170. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
171. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
172. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611-12.
2016] 189
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
law."1 73 It recognized a "danger that the grant of patents that tie
up ... use [of the basic tools of scientific and technological work] will
inhibit future innovation premised upon them."1 7 4 And it concluded
that the "presence here of the basic underlying concern that these
patents tie up too much future use of laws of nature" justified its
"conclusion that the processes described in the patents are not
patent eligible." 7 5 In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, the Court likewise referenced the "considerable danger
that the grant of patents would 'tie up' the use of [the basic tools of
scientific and technological work] and thereby 'inhibit future
innovation premised upon them.""76 In Alice, however, the Court
went even further. It similarly described a risk of preemption of "the
building blocks of human ingenuity." 177 But it also cited preemption
as "the concern that drives th[e] exclusionary principle [of § 101],"178
and then proclaimed that "the pre-emption concern . . . undergirds
our § 101 jurisprudence."e7 9 Thus, the most recent case, Alice,
seemingly made preemption the central concern of a § 101 analysis.
The problem with using any of these concerns with claim breadth
as the basis for a robust § 101 analysis is that the existing statutory
doctrines of novelty, non-obviousness, written description, and
enablement already better address these concerns. Before
considering how they do so, however, it is important first describe
the concern with claim breadth as accurately as possible.
Any concern with the breadth of claims necessarily requires
careful consideration of the particular underlying problem. In other
words, it does not make sense to say alone, "These claims are too
broad." The appropriate response is, "Compared to what?" Without
173. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
174. Id. at 1301.
175. Id. at 1302 ("The presence here of the basic underlying concern that these
patents tie up too much future use of laws of nature simply reinforces our conclusion
that the processes described in the patents are not patent eligible, while eliminating
any temptation to depart from case law precedent.").
176. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013) (describing "considerable danger that the grant of patents would 'tie up'
the use of [the basic tools of scientific and technological work] and thereby inhibit
future innovation premised upon them") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301).
177. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (2014) (describing
the risk of pre-emption of the building blocks of human ingenuity).
178. Id. ("We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle
as one of pre-emption.").
179. Id. at 2358.
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answering the question of what to compare the claims to, the
Supreme Court's free-floating concern provides no objective way to
determine when claims are, in fact, too broad. Moreover, it is
insufficient for the Court simply to say that claims "too broadly
preempt the use of a natural law"18 0 if the Court does not supply any
objective way to determine how much preemption of the use of a
natural law is too much preemption. 18 1 Of course, patents preempt
the use of technology, as patents by definition grant the right to
exclude. 182 The relevant question though is how to determine
whether to grant or sustain that right, and the answer surely cannot
be based on an unconstrained, subjective view of a patent examiner,
jury, or judge.
There are two things, however, that other sections of the existing
patent statute already require examiners and courts to compare
with the scope of claims: (1) the prior art; and (2) the specification of
a patent application or patent. 183 The existing novelty and non-
obviousness requirements deal with the former comparison, 184 while
the existing written description and enablement requirements deal
with the latter comparison. 185 Importantly, these statutory
requirements already address concerns with the breadth of patent
claims. 186 Moreover, as I will show, these requirements exactly
address the two specific concerns with claim breadth identified in
the Supreme Court's opinions: concern with claims covering old
activities and concern with claims preempting the use of the building
blocks of human ingenuity. There is simply no need for the Supreme
Court to develop judicially-created exceptions to patent eligibility to
deal with claim breadth, as these statutory doctrines already deal
with the issue.
2. Existing Statutory Requirements Address the Concerns with
Claim Breadth
The novelty requirement ensures that claims do not cover subject
matter that another person has already invented or disclosed to the
180. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (stating that earlier cases "warn us against
upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a natural
law").
181. See generally id. at 1289.
182. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012).
183. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112(a) (2012).
184. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 (2012), 103 (2012).
185. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
186. See generally id.
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public. 187 The relevant statutory section, § 102, includes detailed
explanations of what activity qualifies as prior art to a claimed
invention. 8 8 The eligibility doctrine includes no such details.18 9 The
case law governing novelty, moreover, strictly requires each and
every element of a claim to be present, expressly or inherently, in a
single prior art reference. 190 By contrast, the eligibility doctrine, as
presently applied allows courts to engage in a much less rigorous
analysis that includes summarizing the claim in the broadest
possible manner before analyzing whether it, or just a part of the
claim, is "conventional." 19 1
The non-obviousness requirement, in turn, ensures that claims
do not come too close to covering subject matter that another person
already has invented or disclosed to the public.1 92 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the non-obviousness requirement, codified in
§ 103, to require a relatively well-defined four-part test that requires
determination of: (1) "The scope and content of the prior art" (relying
upon the well-defined categories of prior art identified in § 102); (2)
the "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue"; (3)
the "level of ordinary skill" in the relevant field of technology; and,
(4) based on the first three determinations, the "obviousness or non-
obviousness" of the claimed invention as a whole, from the
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the relevant field of technology,
including consideration of evidence such as commercial success,
long-felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others that point in the
direction of non-obviousness.193
One might argue that the final determination of non-
obviousness, the fourth step, includes subjectivity that is analogous
to the subjectivity of the search for an inventive concept that is part
187. Prior to the AIA, the novelty requirement of § 102(g) generally awarded a
patent to the first to invent. See Fox Grp., Inc. v. Cree, Inc., 700 F.3d 1300, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2012). After the AIA, the novelty requirement of § 102 generally awards a
patent to the first inventor to disclose the invention. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102
(2012).
188. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
189. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357-59 (2014);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297-98,
1299-30 (2012).
190. See, e.g., In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("To
anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed
invention, either explicitly or inherently.").
191. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357-59]; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297-98, 1299-30 (2012).
192. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
193. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
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of the current patent eligibility test. While a prohibition on being
"too close" to the prior art is not a clear demarcation, one way of
understanding the need for the fuzzy line of the non-obviousness
analysis is that it advances the goal of the patent system by focusing
on whether the subject matter of the claims would have been
invented or disclosed anyway, without the inducement of investment
in research and development that patents provide. And given that
the analysis requires consideration of the hypothetical world of what
would have been, it necessarily involves some guesswork and
estimation. Indeed, the non-obviousness test asks the hypothetical
question whether one of ordinary skill in the relevant field of
technology would have found the claimed invention non-obvious at
the time of the invention.194
With all that said, however, the non-obviousness requirement-
particularly when compared to the search for an inventive concept,
as required by the Supreme Court in the context of eligibility-does
include well-defined objective guidelines for patent examiners and
courts to use in making the relevant determination. The objective
guidelines include the first three steps in the test: identifying the
scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior
art and the claims, and the level of ordinary skill in the relevant
technology. 195 Each of these steps involves a search for an objectively
verifiable fact or set of facts. In addition, the objective guidelines
include the secondary considerations of non-obviousness; it is
objectively verifiable whether there was commercial success, long-
felt but unsolved needs, and failure of others. 196 In short, there are
sufficient objective guidelines used in the non-obviousness analysis
so that it is not wholly subjective and instead is administrable-
guidelines that the patent eligibility analysis sorely lacks,
particularly when asking whether there is an inventive concept.197
194. A fuzzy line encourages inventors to steer clear of prior patent rights, a
concept the Supreme Court has emphasized with respect to the doctrine of
equivalents for purposes of infringement analyses. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-32 (2002). Another way of
understanding the need for such a fuzzy line in the context of the non-obviousness
requirement is that the goal is to determine whether the subject matter of the claims
has already been invented, and we do not trust that all that has been invented is
disclosed in what qualifies as prior art. Thus, we require the subject matter of a
claim to differ more than insignificantly from what is actually disclosed in the prior
art.
195. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.




There is, however, one limitation on use of the novelty and non-
obviousness requirements to meet the concerns with broad claims
that this discussion highlights. Both doctrines focus on what patent
lawyers describe as the "prior art," the "art" that came "prior" to the
invention or the disclosure of the invention. Notably, given that we
are not talking about sculptures or paintings, use of the word "art"
in this context seems like use of a foreign language today. It is a relic
of bygone days. But the history of use of the term "art," in the
context of the term "prior art," highlights that it refers to something
that is made by mankind. 198 Likewise, a definition of "art" from
Samuel Johnson's dictionary in 1792, near the time the word entered
the patent statute,199 indicates that the word meant "[t]he power of
doing something not taught by nature and instinct."200 Based on this
evidence, "art," at least in the sense of "prior art," seems to have
referred to something that is a creation by a human rather than a
naturally-occurring thing or phenomenon. As a result, the
comparison of the claims to "prior art" does not include any
comparison of the claims to naturally-occurring things and
phenomena, unless those naturally-occurring things and phenomena
are disclosed, expressly or inherently, in something that does qualify
as prior art-in other words, something created by mankind, such as
a scientific journal article.201
Thus, one concern with the scope of claims that is not clearly
captured by the novelty and non-obviousness doctrines is the idea
that claims should not merely cover naturally-occurring things or
natural phenomena, and, in particular, those that are not disclosed
in something that qualifies as prior art. 2 0 2 Indeed, that was the
198. Sean M. O'Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual
Property Clause, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 780, 784 (2015) ("Throughout the Middle
Ages, 'art' retained the broad meaning of any human activity.... [Bly the beginning
of the seventeenth century . ... '[a]rt' meant the manipulation of changeable aspects
of the world.").
199. See generally Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (codifed as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105). Congress introduced the term "art" as an
expression of patent eligible subject matter, not to refer to prior art. Here I concern
myself with the meaning of the term "art" in the phrase "prior art," which is a phrase
now used to describe what may invalidate a patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
200. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 162 (10th ed.
1792).
201. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377-78 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (discussing inherent anticipation in the context of a prior art article).
202. Claims should not merely cover naturally-occurring things or natural
phenomena, regardless of whether they are disclosed in something that qualifies as
prior art. The inherent anticipation doctrine, however, already invalidates claims
194 [Vol. 84.157
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reasoning used in Mayo when the Supreme Court rejected the
government's argument that, rather than § 101, "other statutory
provisions [including §§ 102, 103, and 112] can perform th[e
required] screening function."203 The Court pointed out that "§§ 102
and 103 say nothing about treating laws of nature as if they were
part of the prior art when applying those sections." 20 4 This
recognition that there is a limitation on the usefulness of the novelty
and non-obviousness requirements to address the concern with
claims that merely cover natural laws or natural phenomena,
however, should lead to a consideration of the usefulness of other
statutory doctrines, in particular the written description and
enablement requirements, before creating or sustaining an extra-
statutory test to deal with those concerns.
As it turns out, the written description and enablement
requirements probably close any loophole left by the doctrines of
novelty and non-obviousness with respect to the concern over the
breadth of claims. In particular, these doctrines address the
remaining specific concern with claims preempting the use of the
building blocks of human ingenuity, including natural laws and
phenomena.
The written description requirement mandates that the
specification of a patent clearly allow someone of ordinary skill in
the art to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed. 205 In
other words, the specification must convey to one of ordinary skill
that the inventor "had possession of the claimed subject matter as of
the filing date," where possession refers to "possession as shown in
the disclosure." 206 With respect to "genus" or "generic" claims in
particular, compliance with the written description requirement may
be made in two ways: possession may be shown through the
covering naturally-occurring things or natural phenomena disclosed expressly or
inherently in prior art. Id.
203. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012).
204. Id. at 1304. Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court at one point took
the position that at least algorithms were treated as if part of the prior art. See
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1978) ("Whether the algorithm was in fact
known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as one of the basic tools of
scientific and technological work, . . . . it is treated as though it were a familiar part
of the prior art.") (internal quotations omitted).
205. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (reaffirming that the first paragraph of § 112 contains a written description
requirement separate from the enablement requirement).
206. Id. at 1351.
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disclosure of example species of the claimed genus, or through the
disclosure of structural features common to members of the genus. 207
Moreover, the law includes a set of objective guidelines for making a
determination of whether a claim to a genus meets the written
description requirement. 208 These guidelines include identifying the
existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and content of
the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, and the
predictability of the aspect at issue. 209 Thus, the law governing the
written description requirement provides for objective inquiries that
help make the determination of compliance reasonably
ascertainable. And the written description requirement is
particularly applicable to claims that allegedly preempt use of
natural laws and phenomena, because such claims would cover every
or nearly every use of the natural laws, rather than particular
applications of them. These claims would be genus or generic claims
subject to analysis using the doctrine's objective guidelines. By
contrast, the law of patent eligibility does not include any objective
guideline to determine whether claims "too broadly preempt the use
of a natural law." 2 1 0
In turn, the enablement requirement mandates that the
specification describe the "manner and process of making and using
[the claimed invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same."2 1 1 As applied by the Federal Circuit, the enablement
requirement ensures that the specification includes sufficient
disclosure to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the
claimed invention "without undue experimentation." 212 If there is
evidence that some experimentation is needed to practice the
207. Id. at 1352.
208. Id. at 1351 ("For generic claims, we have set forth a number of factors for
evaluating the adequacy of the disclosure, including 'the existing knowledge in the
particular field, the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or
technology, [and] the predictability of the aspect at issue."') (quoting Capon v.
Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
209. Id.
210. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012). (stating that Supreme Court cases "warn us against upholding patents that
claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a natural law").
211. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
212. Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir.




claimed invention, the court refers to a set of objective guidelines or
"factual considerations" to determine "whether the amount of that
experimentation is either 'undue' or sufficiently routine such that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably be expected to carry it
out."213 These factual considerations include
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the
amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence
or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the
invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill
of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability
of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. 2 14
Yet again, the objective nature of these factual considerations
contrast with the unfettered nature of the eligibility requirement's
search for an inventive concept. 215 Moreover, like the written
description requirement, the enablement requirement is particularly
applicable to claims that allegedly preempt use of natural laws,
because such claims would cover every, or nearly every, use of the
natural laws rather than particular applications of them, and these
claims would be subject to the enablement requirement's objective
guidelines, ensuring that one of ordinary skill would be able to make
every use of the natural law or phenomenon without undue
experimentation.
3. The Supreme Court Wrongly Rejected Use of Existing Statutory
Requirements to Address Claim Breadth
Notably, the Supreme Court in Mayo rejected the argument,
considered here, that sections of the patent statute other than § 101
fully address concerns with claim breadth. 216 In this regard the
Court failed to provide any persuasive justification for why the other
sections are insufficient.2 17 The Court cited its precedent as
"rest[ing] their holdings upon section 101, not later sections," and
the fact that application of § 112 would make the "law of nature
213. Id. (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
214. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (citing In re Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547
(B.P.A.I. 1986)).
215. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357-59 (2014).
216. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303-
04 (2012).
217. See generally id.
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exception to § 101 patentability a dead letter." 2 18 Stare decisis,
however, does not depend on the correctness of precedent as a
matter of policy or statutory interpretation. 2 19 The Court also cited
and quoted from the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952,
misleadingly highlighting language explaining that a machine or
manufacture "is not necessarily patentable under section 101."220
The meaning of that phrase is not consistent with the Court's view,
particularly given the context: the phrase following it explains that a
machine or manufacture is not patentable "unless the conditions of
the title are fulfilled," 221 where those conditions are clearly specified
in the patent statute as §§ 102 and 103.222
In the end, the Court did highlight two policy concerns. 223
Neither, however, justifies an expansive and subjective application
of § 101. It explained that "shift[ing] the patent-eligibility inquiry
entirely to [other] sections risks creating significantly greater legal
uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work that
they are not equipped to do." 2 2 4 The first concern, uncertainty, is
particularly ironic; it is hard to believe there could be any more
uncertainty than that created by the current test for eligibility.
Moreover, as I have explained, the other statutory sections invoke
established analyses with objective guidelines firmly grounded in the
relevant policy concerns. Thus, the only real policy question is
whether the other statutory sections are equipped to do the work the
Supreme Court believes § 101 is required to do.
With respect to the novelty and non-obviousness requirements,
the Mayo Court points out that "§§ 102 and 103 say nothing about
treating laws of nature as if they were part of the prior art when
applying those sections." 225 While that is true, it has to be mentioned
how hypocritical it is for the Court to say this. The Court has had no
218. Id.
219. Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
220. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
221. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399.
222. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 797-98 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103) (referring to §§ 102 and 103 as each a "condition of
patentability").
223. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
224. Id.
225. Id. Moreover, even if natural laws were considered to be prior art, the Court
suggests that the result would be that all inventions would be unpatentable because




problem finding implied exceptions to patentability under § 101,
where § 101 itself says nothing about, for example, laws of nature.
Regardless, any deficiency with §§ 102 and 103 highlights the need
to analyze the usefulness of other statutory doctrines, including
those related to § 112.
In that regard, the Court goes on to argue that § 112 does not fill
the gap left by §§ 102 and 103.226 The Court states in a conclusive
fashion that § 112 "does not focus on the possibility that a law of
nature (or its equivalent) that meets these conditions will
nonetheless create the kind of risk that underlies the law of nature
exception, namely the risk that a patent on the law would
significantly impede future innovation." 227 The Court did not explain
this conclusion, but instead merely cited two law review articles
reaching similar conclusions.228
In the first article cited by the Mayo Court, a group of law
professors (1VIark Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, and Polk
Wagner) take the position that the doctrine of patent eligibility
should fill a void supposedly left by § 112.229 Those law professors
make several arguments in support of this position. First, they argue
that that the relevant question "is not whether one could make the
embodiments claimed, but rather whether the inventor has
contributed enough to merit a claim so broad that others will be
locked out." 2 30 On this basis, they argue that preemption is a
relevant concern "even if the patentee has enabled others to use all
currently known embodiments, thus satisfying [the enablement
requirement of| § 112."231
"[W]hether the inventor has contributed enough"232 to merit a
broad claim, however, is not the right question. The eligibility
analysis should not focus, as they claim, on "whether the scope of the
patentee's claims is commensurate with the invention's practical,
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control?
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods after In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES.
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 61 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman
& R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1329-32 (2011)). Justice
Stevens made a similar mistake in his concurring opinion in Bilski. See Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
229. Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 228, at 1329-32.
230. Id. at 1330.
231. Id.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
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real-world contribution."2 33 It is likewise no answer to say, as they
do, that decision-makers should focus on the "the importance of the
patentee's contribution."234 Nor can the decision-maker "balance[e]
the incentives needed for the patentee against the risk of stifling
future innovation" by identifying "how important the patentee's
invention is, as well as how important the future innovation might
be." 2 35 This approach would be particularly problematic. There is no
objective way to determine whether the invention's practical, real-
world contribution (which I understand to refer to the value of the
novel aspect of the claimed invention)236 is "enough" or important
"enough," particularly as compared to the importance of unknown
future innovation, and, critically, during the application process,
long before the claimed invention itself has reached maturity of use.
While the law professors identify five factors "critical to a proper
scope-based determination for patentable subject matter
eligibility," 237 the factors provide no real objective, determinable
constraints on the analysis. For example, who can tell, particularly
during the application process before an invention is used, whether
the invention is "potentially generative of many kinds of new
inventions"? 238 And with respect to whether the relevant industry
"relies heavily on cumulative invention" and whether the field is
"fast-moving,"239 the question is, "compared to what?" Moreover,
existing doctrines better address concerns highlighted by other
factors. The question whether the patentee has "disclosed a small
number of embodiments but claimed a broad inventive principle," 2 4 0
for example, is a question answered by a proper application of § 112.
Likewise, it is a matter for § 103 to ask whether "the patentee [has]
233. Id. at 1315 (emphases added).
234. Id. at 1340 (emphasis added).
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. In context it is clear that the law professors use "contribution" to refer to
the novel aspect of the claimed invention. Had their test asked whether the scope of
the patentee's claims is commensurate with the inventor's disclosure (rather than the
invention's contribution), their test would both ask a question with a determinable
answer and reflect the actual requirements of § 112(a). See, e.g., Application of
Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("That paragraph requires that the scope of
the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by
the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.").






made an important contribution relative to the prior art,"241 so long
as the purely subjective question of "importance" is replaced with the
more objective question of whether one of ordinary skill in the art
would conclude that the claimed invention was non-obvious given
the relevant objective data. In short, other than the factors directly
tied to other sections of the patent statute, the five factors invite
guesswork.
Importance, moreover, is irrelevant for purposes of eligibility and
likely irrelevant for patentability more generally. An assessment of
the importance of the patentee's contribution can be understood to
be an assessment of the value of that contribution. But the value of
the contribution is not a proper component of the patentability
analysis outside of, perhaps, the secondary consideration of non-
obviousness that looks toward commercial success.242 The value of
the contribution is primarily a matter of determining damages, such
as calculating reasonable royalties. 243 In short, an important
invention, when the patent covering it is infringed, will generate
significant lost profits and reasonable royalties. An unimportant
invention will not.
It is important to recognize that the idea that patentability
should be determined based on an assessment of the importance of
the invention is not new; it has been rejected before for good reason.
As Judge Rich once explained, it is an "unsound notion that to be
patentable an invention must be better than the prior art."244 One
reason is that "it would require the Patent Office and the courts
reviewing its final rejections to make a value judgment of a kind
they are not equipped to make and should not be asked to make." 2 4 5
Examiners "could be wrong and the inventor should have his chance"
to introduce an invention into the marketplace, which "will pass
judgment."246
241. Id. (emphasis added).
242. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (describing secondary
considerations of non-obviousness).
243. See generally Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee
Injury, and Sequential Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471 (2012). When
calculated correctly, damages should reflect the value of the patented technology
rather than the value of the patent rights, such as the power to impose negotiation
and litigation costs. See David 0. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value
Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 118-41 (2014).
244. Rich, supra note 90, at 393.




Beyond the argument that § 101 should somehow require
weighing the importance or value of an invention based on the scope
of its claim, the group of law professors also point out that the
written description and enablement requirements concern the
adequacy of the specification only at the time of filing. 24 7 They argue
that § 101 is necessary to address concerns related to follow-on
inventions created after the time of filing. 2 48 According to the law
professors,
under § 112, as long as an inventor sufficiently discloses
those embodiments of the invention that could have been
built at the time of filing, the inventor will generally be
afforded exclusionary rights over later inventions that use
after-arising technology-technology that did not exist at the
time of filing. 2 4 9
Thus, they argue that concerns with after-arising technology justify
a robust role for the eligibility requirement because the written
description and enablement requirements of § 112 do not sufficiently
address those concerns. This argument is misleading, however, in
three respects.
First, the argument glosses over significant aspects of the
enablement and written description requirements of § 112. That is, §
112 does place important constraints upon the extent to which
claims may cover after-arising technologies. For example, the
enablement requirement asks whether the specification enables a
person of ordinary skill in the relevant technology to make and use
the claimed invention without undue experimentation.250 If, given the
disclosure of a patent specification, undue experimentation is
required to build an embodiment of a machine covered by a claim,
the claim is invalid due to a violation of the enablement
requirement. 251 Thus, claims may cover after-arising technologies
only if undue experimentation is not needed to build or use those
technologies. Furthermore, both the enablement and written
247. See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 228, at 1330.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1330-31.
250. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("That some experimentation is necessary does not
preclude enablement; the amount of experimentation, however, must not be unduly
extensive.").
251. Id. at 1566-67.
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description requirements also compel the disclosure of a sufficient
number of representative species of an invention to support a broad
claim to a genus of the invention.25 2
These aspects of the enablement and written description
requirements have a firm historical foundation. Indeed, one example
of how the written description and enablement requirements of § 112
constrain the ability of claims to cover after-arising technologies is
O'Reilly v. Morse, where the Supreme Court invalidated a claim
precisely because the specification, while disclosing an embodiment
of the invention that could have been built at the time the
application was filed, claimed rights that would have covered an
after-arising technology. 2 53 In this regard, it is important to
recognize that O'Reilly v. Morse is a case regarding the enablement
and written description requirements and not the eligibility
requirement. There has been much confusion on this point both by
courtS254 and in the secondary literature. 255 Thus, a more detailed
look at this case is appropriate.
The Supreme Court decided O'Reilly v. Morse in 1854 pursuant
to the Patent Act of 1836, which the Court summarized in part as
requiring
252. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("[A]n adequate written description of a claimed genus requires
more than a generic statement of an invention's boundaries. . . . [A] sufficient
description of a genus instead requires the disclosure of either a representative
number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features
common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can 'visualize or
recognize' the members of the genus."); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75
F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("In unpredictable art areas, this court has refused
to find broad generic claims enabled by specifications that demonstrate the
enablement of only one or a few embodiments and do not demonstrate with
reasonable specificity how to make and use other potential embodiments across the
full scope of the claim.").
253. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
254. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287-93
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing) (discussing
O'Reilly v. Morse in the context of patent eligibility rather than the enablement or
written description requirement).
255. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kresh, Patent Eligibility After Mayo: How Did We Get
Here and Where Do We Go?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 521, 523 (2013) (discussing O'Reilly v.
Morse in the context of patent eligibility rather than the enablement or written
description requirement). See generally Adam Mossoff, O'Reilly v. Morse (Geo. Mason
L. & Econ. Research, Paper No. 14-22, Aug. 18, 2014), http://ssrn.com/




a written description of [the] invention or discovery, "and of
the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and
compounding the same," in such exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art or science to which it
appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make, construct, compound, and use the same. 256
This initial explanation of the governing law, which described the
written description and enablement requirements, is important to
consider in the context of the courts' later explanation of its decision.
Indeed, it points in the direction of the basis for the Court's holding.
Samuel Morse, the inventor of the telegraph, obtained a patent
on his invention in 1840.257 The parties in this case disputed the
validity of the eighth claim in his patent.258 That claim recited "the
exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the
electric or galvanic current, and the result is the marking or printing
intelligible characters, signs, or letters at a distance." 259 The Court
found Claim 8 invalid given its breadth. 260 In the words of the Court,
"If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or
machinery the result is accomplished." 261
In reaching its conclusion of invalidity, the Court focused on
various policies: The prevention of other inventors from making
improvements; the ability of Morse to alone make improvements but
keep those from the public because of the lack of a need to disclose in
a patent application; the idea that the inventor is only entitled to the
process or machine disclosed; and the absurdity of past inventors
obtaining similar rights, for example Fulton obtaining a right to use
steam to propel vessels. 262 But, as shown below, the Court ultimately
faulted Morse for failing to disclose in his specification the process or
machinery to achieve the claimed result; in other words, the claim
failed the enablement and written description requirements.
The Court faulted Morse for claiming a cause and result rather
than the disclosed process or machine. 263 The Court explained that
256. 56 U.S. 62, 118 (1853). The quoted language is the predecessor to the
modern written description and enablement requirements in § 112. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a) (2012).
257. Morse, 56 U.S. at 62.
258. Id. at 62-63.
259. Id. at 112.
260. Id. at 62-63.
261. Id. at 113.
262. Id. at 113-14.
263. Id. at 109.
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the problem with Morse's Claim 8 was that, "[flor aught that we now
know some future inventor . . . may discover a mode of writing or
printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current,
without using any part of the process or combination set forth in the
plaintiffs specification."264 Likewise, it faulted Morse for failing to
"confine his claim to the machinery or parts of machinery, which he
specifies."265 And the Court found trouble with Morse's claim to "an
exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not
describe when he obtained his patent." 2 66 Again and again, the Court
focused on comparing the scope of the claim to the scope of the
disclosure in Morse's patent application to see whether the claimed
invention was described and specified. 267 It is in this context that the
Court concluded that it was "of [the] opinion that the claim is too
broad, and not warranted by law." 2 6 8
Thus, in modern terms, it is quite clear that the problem with
Claim 8 in Morse's patent was based on the enablement and written
description requirements located in § 112 and not in § 101. To use
today's terminology, the specification did not contain a written
description of the invention or enable one of skill in the art to make
and use what was described in Claim 8 without undue
experimentation. 269 In particular, Morse's specification did not
provide sufficient information to show he had possession of the
invention, let alone to empower someone to make every possible
device that could use electromagnetism to print at a distance, which,
as a dramatic indicator of the breadth of Morse's claim, would
include the Internet. Thus, it is simply incorrect for courts and
commentators to cite O'Reilly v. Morse as justification for a robust
role for § 101. The case belongs in the context of the enablement and
written description requirements. 2 70
264. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. Id. (emphases added).
267. Id. at 112-20.
268. Id. at 113.
269. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (discussing the enablement and written description requirement
using these terms).
270. See, e.g., CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 92 (Aspen, 3d ed. 2014)
(placing O'Reilly v. Moore in the chapter related to the enablement requirement); In
re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that in O'Reilly v. Morse "the
claim is properly rejected for what used to be known as 'undue breadth,' but has
since been appreciated as being, more accurately, based on the first paragraph of
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The Supreme Court, at one point at least, understood this
distinction. It fairly clearly made the point in 1928.271 After quoting
the statutory language governing the written description and
enablement requirements, the Court found fault with a claim
covering a type of starch because
[a] claim so broad, if allowed, would operate to enable the
inventor who has discovered that a defined type of starch
answers the required purpose to exclude others from all
other types of starch and so foreclose efforts to discover other
and better types. The patent monopoly would thus be
extended beyond the discovery and would discourage rather
than promote invention. . . . That the patentee may not by
claiming a patent on the result or function of a machine
extend his patent to devices or mechanisms not described in
the patent is well understood. 272
In other words, the enablement and written description
requirements ensure that a patent may not foreclose efforts to
discover other and better types of inventions; the patentee may not
claim a result or function to cover "devices or mechanisms not
§ 112"). In the course of its opinion in O'Reilly v. Morse, the Court did state that "the
discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable."
Morse, 56 U.S. at 116. It said so, however, with respect to another case (Neilson v.
Harford), in the course of distinguishing that case and, in particular, while
presenting a counterfactual representation of the holding in that case. Id. ("And if
this had been the construction, the court, it appears, would have held his patent to
be void; because the discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical
science, is not patentable."); id. at 116-17 ("For Neilson discovered, that by
interposing a heated receptacle between the blower and the furnace, and conducting
the current of air through it, the heat in the furnace was increased. And this effect
was always produced, whatever might be the form of the receptacle, or the
mechanical contrivances for heating it, or for passing the current of air through it,
and into the furnace. But Professor Morse has not discovered, that the electric or
galvanic current will always print at a distance, no matter what may be the form of
the machinery or mechanical contrivances through which it passes."). In other words,
while Neilson v. Harford may have been decided based on one aspect of the law
governing patent eligibility, O'Reilly v. Morse was not.
271. See generally Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245
(1928).
272. Id. at 257 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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described in the patent."273 And what case did the Court cite for this
proposition? O'Reilly v. Morse.274
There is a second problem with the law professors' argument. 275
In addition to glossing over important aspects of the enablement and
written description requirements, their argument-that § 112 does
not address concerns related to follow-on inventions created after the
time of filing276-ignores both the utility requirement and the proper
scope of the experimental use exception to infringement liability.
While the law professors argue that "by moving patenting
downstream, we both permit competition in research and
development and encourage competition among the practical,
applied inventions developed by that research,"277 the reality is that
the utility requirement already does so by requiring that claimed
inventions have substantial, practical, and immediate usefulness. 278
The very point of the utility requirement is to meet the policy
concern they repeatedly articulate concerning the need for claims to
cover "practical applications." 279 In addition, the experimental use
exception to infringement liability should allow follow-on inventors
to experiment on patented inventions to identify, for example,
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 228, at 1331.
276. Id. at 1329-32.
277. Id. at 1331.
278. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) ("The basic quid pro
quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point-where
specific benefit exists in currently available form-there is insufficient justification
for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.").
279. See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 228, at 1331. Indeed, it
is curious how often the law professors recite the need to ensure that claims cover
practical applications of ideas but then, rather than point to the utility requirement
that already requires the claim to cover a practical application of an idea, Brenner,
383 U.S. at 534-35, use this need as justification for an unconstrained, subjective,
and non-statutory eligibility doctrine. Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra
note 228, at 1317. One explanation might be that claims ought to describe the
practical application, not just be supported by disclosure in the specification
concerning the practical application. Another explanation might be that patent
examiners and courts fail to apply this aspect of the utility requirement sufficiently
to address the underlying concern. But see Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful,
98 MINN. L. REv. 1046, 1077 (2014) (arguing the utility requirement is superfluous
and should be effectively eliminated).
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improvements to the patented invention,280 and the statutory
experimental use exception already relieves parties from liability
from using patented inventions to develop and submit information to
the FDA for the approval of drug applications. 281 Thus, rather than
prove that a creative interpretation of § 101 based on relative
importance is necessary to fill a gap left by § 112, it highlights the
usefulness of the utility requirement of § 101 and an appropriate
experimental use exception for infringement liability to fill any such
gap.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the law professors
overlook the central role of the doctrine of equivalents of
constraining the extent to which claims may cover after-arising
technologies. Indeed, the very concept of infringement by after-
arising technologies finds its doctrinal home in the doctrine of
equivalents. 282 And, importantly, that doctrine includes numerous
constraints on whether after-arising technologies may infringe a
claim. For example, the doctrine of equivalents applies on an
280. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83, 91 (2004) (arguing that there
are "reasons to believe that a well-designed experimental-use exemption from
infringement liability can promote faster cumulative technological progress without
significantly diminishing incentives to invest in the original invention" and noting
that "[p]atent exclusivity, while promoting inventive progress by providing incentives
for innovation, can slow technical progress if the best follow-on inventors are
prevented from building upon the inventive idea during the patent term"). See also
Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, The "Experimental Use" Exception Through A
Developmental Lens, 50 IDEA 831, 833 (2010) (arguing that allowing the
experimental use exception to cover "the testing of patented inventions with a view
to creating improvements or inventing around such patents" is "particularly
appealing in the context of developing countries').
281. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) ("[W]e think it apparent from the statutory text that §
271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions
that are reasonably related to the development and submission of any information
under the FDCA. . .. This necessarily includes preclinical studies of patented
compounds that are appropriate for submission to the FDA in the regulatory
process."); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 664 (1990) (affirming the
Federal Circuit's holding that under § 271(e)(1) the use of patented inventions "could
not constitute infringement if [such use] had been undertaken to develop information
reasonably related to the development and submission of information necessary to
obtain regulatory approval under the FDCA.").
282. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37
(1997) (rejecting the argument that the doctrine of equivalents "should be limited to
equivalents that were known at the time the patent was issued, and should not
extend to after-arising equivalents").
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element-by-element basis, so that the doctrine may not be used to
effectively eliminate a claim requirement in its entirety.283 Thus, an
allegedly infringing product must include each and every element of
the claimed invention either literally or, in this context, in the form
of an equivalent after-arising technology. Also, infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents may occur only when there is an
insubstantial difference between the accused technology and the
claimed technology, or if the accused technology performs a
substantially similar function, in a substantially similar way, to
achieve a substantially similar result. 28 4 Thus, the after-arising
technology must be insubstantially different compared to the claim
element in question; a finding of infringement cannot vitiate a claim
element.285 As another constraint, infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents may occur only when prosecution history estoppel
does not eliminate the very application of the doctrine, for example,
when, during prosecution, a claim has been narrowed for a reason of
patentability and no exception applies, 286 or as a result of a clear and
unmistakable surrender of claim scope given arguments made
during prosecution. 287 In short, the law professors unnecessarily
place upon § 101 the burden of addressing scope-related concerns
related to infringement by after-arising technologies; existing
constraints placed upon the doctrine of equivalents already address
those concerns. 288
Beyond these problems with their creative reconstruction of the
analysis required by § 101, the last argument put forward by the
group of law professors in favor of their approach is particularly
ironic. They argue, admittedly prior to the Supreme Court's
unraveling of the law of eligibility in Mayo and Alice, that "the
enablement inquiry itself is extremely difficult and fraught with
283. Id. at 29 ("[T]he doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual
elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.").
284. See id. at 39-40 (allowing these two formulations of the test for
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
285. See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005,
1017 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
286. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
737-38 (2002).
287. Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int'l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("We have recognized that prosecution history estoppel can occur during
prosecution in one of two ways, either (1) by making a narrowing amendment to the
claim ('amendment-based estoppel) or (2) by surrendering claim scope through
argument to the patent examiner ('argument-based estoppel).").
288. See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 228, at 1331.
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contradiction."289 This argument is particularly weak now given the
even more difficult and rudderless search for abstract ideas and
inventive concepts required by the Supreme Court's current
approach to § 101. It is simply not a good argument to say that
problems with application of the enablement requirement justify-
not solving those problems, but instead-the creation of an
alternative legal doctrine embodying even worse problems and
confusion.
In addition to citing the article written by the group of law
professors, the Supreme Court cited a second article written by
another law professor, Rebecca Eisenberg, to support its conclusion
that § 101 is necessary to fill a gap left in the patent statute.29 0
Eisenberg's arguments, however, parallel those of the group of law
professors. For example, she argues that the "enablement doctrine
hardly offers any clearer or more predictable tools than patentable
subject matter for discerning the allowable scope of patent
claims."2 9 1 Again, however, rather than suggesting that the
enablement requirement be modified as necessary to serve its
purpose with more clarity and predictability, she suggests the
appropriateness of a parallel doctrine of eligibility, and as I have
shown one that has turned out to be less clear. Whatever the warts
of the enablement doctrine, 292 the answer is to remove those warts
rather than leave those warts alone and create another even more
confusing doctrine in the context of patent eligibility. But then she
actually recognizes that the written description requirement "has
arguably eclipsed enablement doctrine as a limitation on claim
scope," 29 3 without any concomitant criticism of the doctrine as
unworkable. Likewise, she similarly argues that what are
"[p]articularly problematic for [the] enablement doctrine are claims
that cover future embodiments using technologies that have yet to
be invented as of the filing date."2 9 4
Eisenberg's arguments miss the mark for the same reasons as
the group of law professors. The written description and enablement
requirements are the statutory tools to invalidate broad claims
289. Id.
290. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304
(2012).
291. Eisenberg, supra note 228, at 59.
292. Id. at 59 n.290 (citing criticisms of the enablement doctrine by Tun-Jen
Chiang, Kevin Collins, and Jeffrey Lefstin).
293. Id. at 60.
294. Id. at 59.
210 [Vol. 84.157
CONFUSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY
lacking support in the specification. And O'Reilly v. Morse, as
already described, 295 fully supports use of these requirements to
prevent patents from issuing with claims broad enough to cover
technologies that have yet to be invented. More recent case law
supports the same point, expressly describing how the enablement
and written description requirements prevent these claims. In
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping Inc., for example, the
Federal Circuit explained that a specification's "description of one
method for creating a [device] does not entitle the inventor . . . to
claim any and all means for achieving that objective." 296 The court
continued:
The single embodiment would support such a generic claim
only if the specification would "reasonably convey to a person
skilled in the art that [the inventor] had possession of the
claimed subject matter at the time of filing," . . . and would
"enable one of ordinary skill to practice 'the full scope of the
claimed invention."' 2 9 7
In this way, the court explained that both the enablement and
written description requirements are not met where a claim is
supported only by one or a limited number of embodiments and, as a
result, one of skill in the art would not be able to recognize from the
description either: (1) how to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention or (2) that the applicant or named inventor had
possession of the full scope of the claimed invention.298 Regardless,
Eisenberg's arguments similarly omit consideration of the scope-
constraining aspects of the doctrine of equivalents.
Beyond concerns with broad claims generally, the Supreme
Court and these law professors' position that the patent statute-
outside of the eligibility requirement of § 101-cannot be used to
invalidate a claim to a law of nature is likewise incorrect. A claim to
a law of nature by definition covers all uses of that law of nature,
and it would be exceedingly difficult for any specification to provide
295. See supra p. 44-48.
296. 424 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
297. Id. at 1346 (citations omitted) (quoting Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d
1116, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247,
1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). The court explained that, "[a]fter reading the patent, a person
of skill in the art would not understand how to make [the device] generically and
would not understand LizardTech to have invented a method for making [the device],
except by" the particular method disclosed. Id. at 1345.
298. Id. at 1346.
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written description and enablement support-or meet the utility
requirement-for the scope of such a claim. Practical applications of
the underlying law of nature must be supported in the specification.
Even if a claim were drafted to cover every possible practical
application, it seems impossible to include written description
support, in particular, and even enablement support for such a
claim. Moreover, during patent terms any concern with preemption
of use of laws of nature may also be addressed by the experimental
use exception to patent infringement liability.2 9 9
In short, § 101 should not be treated as the panacea of patent
law; to the extent there are problems with the other statutory
conditions and requirements of patentability-or more likely the
correct application of those conditions and requirements-those
problems should be addressed and resolved, rather than propping up
a new and particularly confusing approach to patent eligibility.300
4. Even if § 101 Was Needed to Exclude Patenting of Natural Laws
and Phenomena, A Simple Statutory Interpretation Would Do So
But even one of § 101's statutory patentability requirements-the
subject matter requirement-already rules out the patenting of a
naturally-occurring phenomenon or law of nature. An important
feature of the subject matter requirement is the prerequisite that
the invention be the result of human effort. Indeed, every category
listed in the statute describes something that is the result of human
effort: "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any .. . improvement thereof." 3 01
299. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012) (statutory experimental use exception); Madey
v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (common law experimental use
exception).
300. Any continued concern with preemption of the basic building blocks of
human ingenuity, even in light of the written description, enablement, and utility
requirements, and even in light of the experimental use exception to infringement
liability, still overlooks the limited terms of patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012)
(describing the term of the statutory right to exclude). Any preemption is not
permanent but temporary. The grant of a right to exclude for a limited time period is
the reward for the discovery of the new, non-obvious, useful invention and the
disclosure of a specification that clearly claims and describes that invention and how
to make and use it without undue experimentation. In other words, Congress has
made the policy choice that patents should be available as rewards for this activity.
It is presumptuous for the Supreme Court to take the position that Congress does
not mean for this reward to be available-unless, of course, doing so would violate
the Constitution.
301. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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Consider the newest category, "process." In 1952 Congress
replaced "art" in the patent statute with "process," putting the term
"process" in § 101 in the context of the subject matter requirement.
At the same time, Congress included a definition of process in § 100,
which explains that "[t]he term 'process' means process, art or
method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or material." 302 In the House
and Senate Reports accompanying this change, the drafters clarified
that in this context "art" and "process or method" mean the same
thing.303
Federico's commentary on the Patent Act of 1952 provides an
enlightening description of what led to the replacement of "art" with
"process" in § 101 and the inclusion of the definition of process in
§ 100. Indeed, his discussion sheds so much light on the process
category, as well as the other unaltered categories ("machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, and . . . improvements
thereof"), that it is worth quoting at length:
In one sense every invention is nothing but the result of new
uses of old materials. But discussions of the patentability of
new uses are usually concerned with the simple situation in
which a discovery has been made that a known substance or
thing has some hitherto unknown property, or can be used to
obtain a particular result for which i[t] had not been used
before. If the new use results in a new machine, or a new
manufacture, or a new composition of matter, or an
improvement on any of these, a patent may be issued for any
of these things provided the necessary conditions can be met.
Difficulties arise when no new or improved machine,
manufacture or composition of matter has resulted. Since
there is no new or improved object produced, the only things
left to consider are the acts performed, which leads to a
process or method and the statute, as has been said,
302. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012).
303. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2398-99 ("[Tjhe word 'art' which appears in the present statute has been changed to
the word 'process.' 'Art' in this place in the present statute has a different meaning
than the words 'useful art' in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use
of the word 'art' in other places in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to
be practically synonymous with process or method. The word 'process' has been used
to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word 'art' as used in this place means




recognizes a process or method which involves only a new
use of an old material, as within the field of subject matter
capable of being patented. 304
In this passage, Federico highlights that machines, manufactures,
compositions of matter, and improvements of these things must be
"new" in the sense that they are different as compared to what came
before them, or at least their use (a claimed process or method using
an old machines, manufactures, compositions of matter) must be
different compared to prior uses.
Significantly, at least in the abstract and without regard to the
statute, one might suppose this requirement of newness may be
applied in a comparison with either prior natural materials or prior
manmade materials. Either way, for a thing to qualify for patenting,
that thing must be different as compared to the prior materials (or
its use must be different). As Federico explained, if the thing is the
same as the old material, then the only way to obtain a patent is to
claim a new use of the old material. In both respects-with respect to
claims to materials and claims to processes-something must be
added to what came before the material or process; the focus, in the
words of Federico, is on the "result" with respect to materials and
"acts performed" with respect to processes.30 5
Now, consider the patent statute. Section 102 already takes care
of a comparison of the claimed thing to prior manmade materials
and processes. 306 But that section seems to be silent with respect to a
comparison of the claimed thing to prior natural materials and
processes. Since § 102 does not expressly contemplate comparing a
claimed invention with prior natural materials and processes, an
independent requirement of the language in § 101 ("new . .. process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new ...
improvement thereof") might be that the claimed material or the
claimed process must include something manmade; the material or
process must be the result of human effort. 307 This focus on human
304. P.J. Federico, COMMENTARY ON THE NEw PATENT ACT, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1
(West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 161, 177-78 (1993).
305. Id.
306. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2399 (explaining that § 102 provides a definition of "newness" in § 101).
307. I discuss above that I do not think this is necessary given the enablement
and written description requirements. See supra Part III.B.2. But even if I am wrong
in that regard, the subject matter requirement need not be interpreted other than to




effort is a shorthand way to describe the idea that the claimed
material or process cannot be the same as what already existed in
nature.
Now consider a dictionary definition of the word "art," which
"process" replaced. "Art" provides additional insight on the question
of whether "process" should encompass natural processes. "Art"
entered the patent statute in the Patent Act of 1790.308 Notably, as I
highlighted above, in Samuel Johnson's dictionary from 1792, the
first and most relevant definition of "art" is "[t]he power of doing
something not taught by nature and instinct."309 Recall that in 1952,
when Congress replaced "art" with "process," it not only included a
definition of "process" that includes "art,"310 but also prepared
reports explaining that "art" and "process or method" mean the same
thing.311
Notably, this is all consistent with the Supreme Court's
historical interpretation of "process" in § 101 as excluding natural
processes. 312 The reason "process" does not include natural
processes, however, is because "process" as used in § 101 refers to
something created by mankind; it is the result of human effort. 313
308. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
309. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 83 (10th ed.
1792).
310. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2012).
311. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394,
2398-99 ("[T]he word 'art' which appears in the present statute has been changed to
the word 'process.' 'Art' in this place in the present statute has a different meaning
than the words 'useful art' in the Constitution, and a different meaning than the use
of the word 'art' in other places in the statutes, and it is interpreted by the courts to
be practically synonymous with process or method. The word 'process' has been used
to avoid the necessity of explanation that the word 'art' as used in this place means
'process or method,' and that it does not mean the same thing as the word 'art' in
other places.").
312. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (recognizing
that "the Supreme Court has held that the meaning of 'process' as used in § 101 is
narrower than its ordinary meaning" because "the Court has held that a claim is not
a patent-eligible 'process' if it claims 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or]
abstract ideas"') (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)); Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978) ("The holding [in Benson] forecloses a purely literal
reading of § 101."); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
313. An example of a natural process is photosynthesis. See Peter M. Kohlhepp,
When the Invention Is an Inventor: Revitalizing Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude
Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 779, 805 n.161 (2008) (using
photosynthesis as an example of a process that should be deemed unpatentable
because it is a natural phenomenon). Under the theory explored here, the first to
discover and describe the process of photosynthesis would not have been able to
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For eligibility purposes there is no historical requirement that there
be an inventive concept, if that phrase means some relatively
significant contribution to the natural process rather than any
practical use of that natural process. 3 14
So, if "process" as used in § 101 requires human effort, what
about the remaining categories listed in § 101? Consider, first,
"machine" and "manufacture." "Machine," like "art," entered the
patent statute in the Patent Act of 1790,315 and Samuel Johnson's
1792 dictionary included a first definition of "machine" as "[a]ny
complicated piece of workmanship." 316 'Manufacture" also entered
the patent statute in 1790,317 and Samuel Johnson defined this noun
in 1792 as "[t]he practice of making any piece of workmanship" and
"[a]ny thing made by art."3 18 Both of these definitions incorporate
terms, "workmanship" and "art," that clearly contemplate human
creation or human effort.
Finally, consider "composition of matter," a phrase that entered
the patent statute in the Patent Act of 1793, three years after
Congress passed the first patent statute. 319 Samuel Johnson defined
the term "composition" in 1792 in various ways, the first and most
relevant being "[t]he act of forming an integral of various dissimilar
parts."3 20 Other relevant definitions included "[a] mass formed by
mingling different ingredients," and "[t]he state of being
obtain a patent on it because it was not created by a person; it was not the result of
human effort. It inherently existed in nature, whether or not it was known to exist.
314. See Lefstin, supra note 108, at 565. The historical requirement of a practical
application of a principle, as distinguished from an inventive application of a
principle, is seen most clearly in Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132 (1859). In that case,
the Court no less than eleven times explains that while a principle in and of itself is
not eligible for patenting, a practical application of a principle is. See, e.g., id. at 135-
36 ("A patent will be good, though the subject of the patent consists in the discovery
of a great, general, and most comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if
that principle is, by the specification, applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to
effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously attained.") (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Househill Coal & Iron Co. v. Neilson, Webster's Patent Case 673,
683 (House of Lords 1843)).
315. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
316. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 538 (10th ed.
1792).
317. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
318. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 545 (10th ed.
1792).
319. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (1793).




compounded; union; conjunction." 321 Johnson defined "compound," in
turn, among other ways to mean "[t]o mingle many ingredients
together" and "[t]o form by uniting various parts; he compounded a
medicine." 3 22 Each of these definitions points in the direction of
human effort. Given that these definitions include the terms "act"
and "forming," "formed by mingling," and "compounded," it seems
clear that a "composition of matter" is not just a collection of matter,
but a collection of matter that has been created by a human act; it is
the result of human effort.
This understanding-that anything that is the result of human
effort is eligible for patenting at least from the perspective of the
subject matter requirement-is confirmed by the legislative history
of the Patent Act of 1952. In both the Senate and House Reports
accompanying the Patent Act of 1952, Federico explained that
"anything under the sun that is made by man" qualifies as eligible
subject matter.323 Here is the full statement from the legislative
history: "A person may have 'invented' a machine or a manufacture,
which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but
it is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the
conditions of [this] title are fulfilled." 3 2 4
This statement highlights two aspects of modern patent law.
First, it speaks to the structure of the patent statute. In particular it
illustrates that the determination of patentability is a two-step
process. The two requirements of § 101 (statutory subject matter and
utility) must be analyzed, and then the conditions of §§ 102 and 103
(novelty, statutory bars, and non-obviousness) must also be
analyzed. Despite Judge Mayer's recent protestations to the
contrary, 325 it is clear that these requirements may be analyzed in
321. Id.
322. Id. at 190-91.
323. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399
(emphasis added).
324. Id.
325. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 718-20 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(Mayer, J., concurring) (referring to § 101 as the "gateway to the Patent Act" and
describing alleged benefits of addressing § 101 as a threshold question); I/P Engine,
Inc. v. AOL, Inc., 576 F. App'x 982, 995-96 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring)
("To fail to address at the very outset whether claims meet the strictures of section
101 is to put the cart before the horse. Until it is determined that claimed subject
matter is even eligible for patent protection, a court has no warrant to consider
subordinate validity issues such as non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 or
adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112."); MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn
Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("This court must
2016] 217
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
any order.326 Indeed, there is reason to think, given the confusion
around § 101, that §§ 102 and 103 should be analyzed first. 32 7
Anyway, the point is that only when a patent application satisfies all
of these requirements and conditions may it be deemed to include a
"patentable invention." Of course, for any patent to issue covering
this patentable invention, the patent applicant must also satisfy
other requirements under the statute, including primarily the
specification requirements expressed in § 112.328 Second, Federico's
statement shows that the statutory subject matter requirement (and
in particular the machine and manufacture categories) is so broad
that all it prohibits is subject matter not made by man-in modern
terminology subject matter that is not created by, or in other words
the result of, human effort.
The Supreme Court continues to misunderstand Federico's
statement.329 Justice Stevens, for example, confuses the two points
the statement teaches. In Bilski, for example, Justice Stevens states:
first resolve the issue of whether the [] patents are directed to an unpatentable
'abstract idea' before proceeding to consider subordinate issues related to
obviousness and anticipation.").
326. MySpace, Inc., 672 F.3d at 1260 ("Rather than taking the path the dissent
urges, courts could avoid the swamp of verbiage that is § 101 by exercising their
inherent power to control the processes of litigation . . . and insist that litigants
initially address patent invalidity issues in terms of the conditions of patentability
defenses as the statute provides, specifically §§ 102, 103, and 112. If that were done
in the typical patent case, litigation over the question of validity of the patent would
be concluded under these provisions, and it would be unnecessary to enter the murky
morass that is § 101 jurisprudence. This would make patent litigation more efficient,
conserve judicial resources, and bring a degree of certainty to the interests of both
patentees and their competitors in the marketplace."); see also Ultramercial, 657
F.3d at 1325 ("This court has never set forth a bright line rule requiring district
courts to construe claims before determining subject matter eligibility. Indeed,
because eligibility is a 'coarse' gauge of the suitability of broad subject matter
categories for patent protection . .. claim construction may not always be necessary
for a § 101 analysis."), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. WildTangent,
Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
327. See MySpace, Inc., 672 F.3d at 1260.
328. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
329. Indeed, Justice Stevens may have even misunderstood arguments made
concerning this phrase. He, for example, dismissed arguments in Bilski based on a
straw-man: "We have never understood that piece of legislative history to mean that
any series of steps is a patentable process." Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 642
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). In context, he seems to use




Viewed as a whole, it seems clear that this language does not
purport to explain that "anything under the sun" is
patentable. Indeed, the language may be understood to state
the exact opposite: that "[a] person may have 'invented' . . .
anything under the sun," but that thing "is not necessarily
patentable under section 101."330
Justice Stevens then goes on to interpret § 101 to do more than
eliminate eligibility for things not "made by man." He interprets
§ 101 broadly to prohibit so-called "business method" patents, which
he views as undeserving of patent protection. 331 What Justice
Stevens means, then, in context, is that § 101 itself requires more
than subject matter that both falls within the identified categorieS 332
and is the result of human effort.
Justice Stevens misunderstands the statement from the
legislative history.333 His confusion, in part, may result from
confusion over the meaning of the word "patentable," as I have
already discussed. 334 To Justice Stevens, "patentable" seems to mean
that a patent shall issue. In other words, what he seems to be saying
is that, even if something is made by man, that alone does not mean
that a patent shall issue. So much as it goes, that is true, but that is
true only because the other statutory conditions and requirements
must be met, not because a so-called "implicit exception" to § 101
needs to be met. This is where Justice Stevens goes wrong in his
analysis. He believes § 101 itself, divorced from the other statutory
sections, must do all the work to prohibit claims from being
patented. In particular, there is no independent requirement in §
101 that the subject matter be novel as compared to prior art. Nor is
there any independent requirement in § 101 that the subject matter
be "inventive" as compared to prior art. Those are matters of concern
for the separate statutory sections addressing them, §§ 102 and 103.
Even the word "new" in § 101 does not require a novelty analysis
330. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
331. See id. at 643-56 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
332. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming the rejection
of a claim for signals because signals do not fall within any of the categories listed in
§ 101).
333. Justice Stevens is not alone in his misunderstanding; even a senior judge on
the Federal Circuit misconstrues the legislative history. See also Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 720 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring).
334. See supra Part III.A.
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with respect to prior art, because that is the exact function of
§ 102.335
His confusion also may stem from the fact that, under the patent
statute-and despite its awkward phraseology-§ 101 is the
granting provision. That is, § 101 indicates that when a patent
applicant satisfies the requirements and conditions of Title 35, that
applicant may obtain a patent for his or her invention.336 The
following sections of Title 35 state conditions precedent to the grant
of rights expressed in § 101. Section 102, for example, explains that
"[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless" the conditions
expressed in that section are not met. 3 3 7 Section 103, moreover,
explains that "[a] patent for a claimed invention may not be
obtained" if another condition expressed in that section is not met.3 38
Justice Stevens's confusion in this regard is highlighted by his
omission of the critical, final phrase from Federico's statement: "A
person may have 'invented' . . . anything under the sun," but that
thing "is not necessarily patentable under section 101 unless the
conditions of [this] title are fulfilled."3 39
Justice Stevens's reliance on Diamond v. Chakrabarty340 is
misplaced. Justice Stevens argues that, "even in the Chakrabarty
opinion, which relied on this quote, we cautioned that the 1952
Reports did not 'suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces
every discovery."'341 Of course § 101 does have limits and, in
particular, does not embrace every discovery. But that tautology
does not necessarily mean anything other than the fact that the
discovery must be applied, such that what is claimed is something
"made by man"; and that is consistent with the requirement that
what is claimed must be a human creation or, in other words, the
result of human effort. The statutory subject matter requirement, for
example, does not permit the patenting of E=mc 2 because that
formula does not express anything made by man. As a result, even
though Albert Einstein was the first to identify this equation, he
could not obtain a patent on the equation itself. The fact that the
equation was novel, could be useful, and was non-obvious did not
335. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399.
336. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
337. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
338. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
339. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 642 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (emphasis added).
340. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
341. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309).
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make it patentable. To obtain a patent, Einstein would have had to
apply the formula in a new process or to make something new that
used the formula. Unfortunately, Justice Stevens's confusion has
taken root: In Mayo and Alice, Justice Breyer perpetuated Justice
Stevens's position. 342
In sum, the Supreme Court's creative approach to interpreting
§ 101 to limit claim scope is simply not necessary. The statutory
doctrines found in §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112-subject matter, utility,
enablement, written description-already do the work of limiting the
scope of claims and prohibiting the patenting of laws of nature.
Moreover, they do so using doctrines rooted in the patent statute
that have well-developed objective tests. Likewise, the statutory
experimental use exception-and a properly interpreted common-
law experimental use exception-should allow follow-on inventors to
experiment on patented inventions to identify, for example,
improvements to patented inventions. 343
C. Claim Abstractness
Beyond concerns with the breadth of claims, claims that cover
prior art, and preemption of the basic building blocks of human
ingenuity, consider the Supreme Court's expressed concern with
abstractness of claim language.
1. Problems with the Supreme Court's Test
In its recent decisions, the Supreme Court has focused its
concern on claim abstractness. In Bilski, in particular, the Court
concluded that "[t]he concept of hedging . . . is an unpatentable
abstract idea."344 In Mayo, the Court was focusing on abstractness
when it stated that "to transform an unpatentable law of nature into
a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than
simply state the law of nature while adding the words 'apply it."'345
342. See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
343. The common law experimental use exception does not except from
infringement liability all experiments conducted with the purpose of identifying
improvements to the patented technology. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351,
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
344. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (concluding that "[tihe concept of hedging, described
in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable
abstract idea").
345. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
2016] 221
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
And in Alice, the Court held that "the claims at issue are drawn to
the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely
requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention."346
Despite this concern with abstractness of claims, one of the most
significant problems with asking patent examiners and courts to
decide whether claims are abstract is that no one really knows how
to determine whether claims are abstract. In Bilski, all the Court
could do was analogize to its precedents; it never explained exactly
what an abstract claim is, let alone provide objective guidelines to
make such a determination.347 And the only way the Supreme Court
suggested in Mayo to make the determination-effectively to
summarize the claim and ignore or at least discount its express
limitationS 348-iS wrong for at least three reasons.
First, it flatly contradicts its own precedent in Diamond v. Diehr
to the extent it requires ignoring claim limitations.349 In Alice, the
Court attempted to show how Mayo did not contradict Diehr by
requiring an analysis of the whole claim, even if a separate analysis
allows limitations to be ignored.3 s But Alice's analysis of the whole
claim wrongly focuses on whether limitations are "conventional"
versus "inventive," which is an analysis reserved for the more
definitive test of non-obviousness pursuant to § 103 and its objective
guidelines. 351 In effect, Alice sanctions ignoring conventional
346. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352.
347. See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609-13.
348. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296-97.
349. Compare id. at 1298 ("To put the matter more succinctly, the claims inform
a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; any additional steps consist of well-
understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific
community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add nothing significant beyond
the sum of their parts taken separately. For these reasons we believe that the steps
are not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable
applications of those regularities.") with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89
(1981) ("In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the
presence of the old elements in the analysis.").
350. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 n.3 ("Because the approach we made explicit in
Mayo considers all claim elements, both individually and in combination, it is
consistent with the general rule that patent claims 'must be considered as a whole."')
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188).
351. See generally Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention"
Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26 (1972), reprinted in 41 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2013) (discussing
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limitations, but it is those very limitations that may indicate that
the claimed subject matter is a practical application of an idea.
Second, the Court's approach-summarizing the claim and
ignoring or at least discounting express limitations to determine
whether the claim is abstract 3 52 -iS wrong because it is wholly
circular. It is less a method of determining whether a claim is
abstract than a method of determining whether the idea underlying
the claim is abstract. And, by definition, that idea is more abstract
than the claim that is not summarized and whose limitations are not
ignored or discounted. If after taking an abstraction of a claim one
asks, "is this abstract," the answer quite clearly will always be "yes,"
at least if the only relevant comparison is the abstracted claim
compared to the original claim. And the Supreme Court did not
provide any guidance to make any other comparison. 353
Third, without any objective guidelines, the current eligibility
analysis leaves a patent examiner or court to determine whether a
claim is too abstract and whether there is any inventive concept
based on a purely subjective assessment.
2. Existing Statutory Requirements Address Abstractness, Yet the
Supreme Court Has Not Even Addressed Them
The irony with respect to the problem of subjectivity in
determining whether a claim is too abstract or whether the claim
includes an inventive concept, is that the existing utility, written
description, and definiteness requirements, as well as the statutory
limit on functional claiming, already address concerns with
abstractness, while the non-obviousness requirement already seeks
to identify whether there is an inventive concept claimed. And the
law that has developed around those doctrines have objective
guidelines to provide meaningful direction to patent examiners and
courts.
I have already discussed the written description, enablement,
and utility requirements in the context of restraining claim scope. 354
Those doctrines, taken as a whole, also address the problem of
abstractness. The written description requirement ensures that a
claim describes what an inventor actually invented, rather than
§ 103's role in shifting the focus of patentability from "invention" to non-
obviousness).
352. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296-97.
353. See generally id.
354. See supra Part III.
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some abstraction of what was invented, by mandating that a patent's
specification clearly allow someone of ordinary skill in the art to
recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed.355 By
mandating that the specification describe the "manner and process
of making and using [the claimed invention], in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same," 356 the enablement requirement ensures that a
claim describes something specific that is reproducible rather than
some abstraction. And by mandating that a claimed invention have
substantial, practical, and immediate usefulness, 357 the utility
requirement ensures that a claimed invention has a presently
available, specific utility rather than some abstract notion of how the
claimed invention might be useful in the future.
Also consider the definiteness requirement. By ensuring that
claims are reasonably certain,358 the definiteness requirement
ensures that a claim is not vague. While it may be true that,
standing alone, the definiteness requirement cannot invalidate
abstract claims-because the definiteness requirement "asks
whether a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) could
understand the claims, regardless of how abstract or applied they
might be"3 59-it does help ensure that claims are clear so that it is
possible to determine their scope. Beyond eliminating vagueness
(which really is one type of abstractness), therefore, the definiteness
requirement serves an important helping function; only when a
patent examiner or court can determine the scope of a claim can it
determine whether that scope is supported by a disclosure in the
specification that meets the written description, enablement, and
355. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (reaffirming that § 112, first paragraph, contains a written
description requirement separate from the enablement requirement).
356. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
357. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) ("The basic quid pro
quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point-where
specific benefit exists in currently available form-there is insufficient justification
for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.").
358. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)
("[W]e hold that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the
specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with
reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.").
359. See Lemley, Risch, Sichelman & Wagner, supra note 228, at 1331.
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utility requirements, which as discussed above are the statutory
doctrines that prevent claims from covering mere abstractions. 3 6 0
But there is more. Yet another doctrine that reins in claim
abstraction is the statutory limit on functional claiming expressed in
§ 112(f).36 1 It allows for an element in a claim to be expressed in
functional language ("as a means or step for performing a specified
function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support
thereof'), but limits the construction of this language "to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof."362 Thus, while one might
express a claim in terms of a result, the claim must be interpreted to
be limited to the way to achieve that result that is identified in the
specification (and its equivalents). Section 112(f) therefore works to
limit claims to specific embodiments or applications rather than
abstract ideas.36 3
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Supreme Court's
test for patent eligibility-couched as a test to control abstract
claiming in Alice-turns, in the end, on whether a claim includes an
inventive concept.364 On this issue it is quite clear that the non-
obviousness requirement is the statutory doctrine that replaced the
inquiry of whether there is an inventive concept claimed. Congress
included the non-obviousness requirement in § 103 to overrule
aspects of the "invention" requirement. 365 And, as I have discussed,
the non-obviousness analysis includes relevant objective guidelines
to provide constraint and direction to the analysis. 3 6 6
It is important to recognize that, unlike the Supreme Court's
consideration of whether the existing statutory requirements
address the underlying concerns with claim breadth,367 the Court
360. See supra Part III.
361. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).
362. Id.
363. Lemley likewise criticizes the doctrines courts have used to analyze
functional claiming. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional
Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 964 (2013) (arguing that "[i]t is time to end
functional claiming (again)"). The Federal Circuit, however, has recently tightened
its application of § 112(f) to ensure that more claims require disclosure of supporting
structure and algorithms. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339,
1351-54 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
364. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
365. Rich, supra note 351, at 33-34 ("The first policy decision underlying § 103
was to cut loose altogether from the century-old term 'invention."').
366. See supra Part III.B.2.
367. See supra Part III.A.
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has not even considered whether the existing statutory requirements
address its concern with abstractness. Indeed, while the Court's
central concern in Alice was abstractness, 368 the Court did not
analyze whether the enablement requirement (or any of the other
statutory requirements) adequately addresses abstractness. Instead,
the Court simply adopted wholesale the two-part test from Mayo.3 69
Moreover, while I have already mentioned that § 101's statutory
patentability requirements already rule out the patenting of mere
ideas, the search for an inventive concept actually contradicts the
utility requirement. This simple fact should not be discounted. An
important feature of the utility requirement is the condition that
only practical applications of ideas are eligible for patenting. 370 This
search for a practical application-a test rooted in precedent and
policy and one relatively easy to apply-is the opposite of the test the
Court adopted in Alice, the search for an "inventive application" of an
idea. 371
In sum, the Supreme Court's creative approach to interpreting
§ 101 to prohibit abstract claiming is simply not necessary. Statutory
doctrines found in §§ 101, 103, and 112-written description,
enablement, utility, definiteness, the limitation on functional
claiming, and non-obviousness-already do the work of prohibiting
the patenting of abstract ideas. Moreover, they do so using doctrines
rooted in the patent statute that have well-developed objective
tests. 372
368. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2349-50.
369. Id. at 2355. Interestingly, the Court did not even pay lip service to its more
recent decision on eligibility, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), which itself did not use Mayo's two-part test. See generally
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2347.
370. See supra note 326.
371. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012)).
372. The actual concern underlying the prohibition on patenting "abstract ideas"
might be one with claims covering non-technological inventions. This may have been
Justice Stevens's concern in Bilski, although he did not cloak his concern under the
guise of prohibiting abstract ideas. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 614 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Rather than making any broad statements about how to
define the term 'process' in § 101 or tinkering with the bounds of the category of
unpatentable, abstract ideas, I would restore patent law to its historical and
constitutional moorings. For centuries, it was considered well established that a
series of steps for conducting business was not, in itself, patentable."). This concern
explains the Federal Circuit's use of the prohibition on patenting abstract ideas to
affirm rejections of claims in recent cases. See, e.g., In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 818
(Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[W]e conclude that Applicants' claims, directed to rules for
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IV. LACK OF ADMINISTRABILITY
Beyond confusing relevant policies and doctrines, the current
approach to determining patent eligibility lacks administrability. It
is exceedingly difficult to understand whether an patent examiner or
a court should find subject matter eligible for patenting given the
overarching test for eligibility articulated by the Supreme Court.
That test includes no objective guidance but leaves the
determination of eligibility to the unconstrained, subjective opinion
of a patent examiner or judge.
Of the four decisions in the past six years on the issue of patent
eligibility, the most confusing might be the most recent, Alice v. CLS
Bank.37 3 As I have described, Alice sets forth the two-part test now
governing the issue of eligibility.374 With respect to both parts of the
test, Alice ensured there would be substantial confusion in the
governing law. To review: First, the examiner or judge must
determine whether a patent claim is directed to an ineligible
concept: a law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or an abstract
idea.375 Second, the examiner or judge must determine whether
something in the claim transforms the nature of the claim into a
patent-eligible application of the ineligible concept, an analysis
identified as the search for an inventive concept-one that
sufficiently ensures that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself.3 7 6
This test for ineligibility requires two increasingly confusing
analyses. To use a term coined by Justice Scalia with respect to his
understanding of another patentability test, the test for ineligibility
is "gobbledygook."3 77 Take each part of the test in turn.
conducting a wagering game, compare to other 'fundamental economic practice[s]'
found abstract by the Supreme Court."); Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F.
App'x 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming the rejection of "claims ... directed to
the abstract idea of 'solv[ing a] tampering problem and also minimiz[ing] other
security risks' during bingo ticket purchases"). And it provides a basis to reject
claims to a diaper service, Rich, supra note 90, at 393-94, a method of shooting a free
throw, or a purely mental process. These claims are not really abstract but instead
cover non-technological inventions.
373. 134 S. Ct. 2347.
374. See supra Part II.B.
375. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
376. Id.
377. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007) (No. 04-1350) (Scalia, J.) (discussing his understanding of the Federal
Circuit's teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine test).
2016] 227
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
A. Whether a Claim is Directed to a Law of Nature, Physical
Phenomenon, or Abstract Idea
Consider the first part of the test.3 7 8 What does it mean for a
claim to be "directed" to an ineligible concept? Use of the term
"directed" seemingly invites courts to ignore claim language. On the
one hand, that, in fact, is what the Supreme Court and lower courts
have done; if the claim language merely describes something
conventional, then courts effectively ignore it.3> But the Supreme
Court itself has said, on the other hand, that that is not what courts
should do.3 8 0 In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court held that:
In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process
for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the
presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is
particularly true in a process claim because a new
combination of steps and a process may be patentable even
though all of the constituents of the combination were well
known and in common use before the combination was made.
The "novelty" of any element or steps in the process, or even
of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possible patentable subject matter.381
There is great logic behind the idea that courts should not ignore
claim language. While there is a fear that patent drafters will be
able to draft claim language creatively to avoid a holding of
invalidity based on ineligibility, that should be exactly what the
system prefers. The point is to cause the patent drafter to draft the
claim language so it describes something specific that may be
compared to prior art and to any allegedly infringing product or
378. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
379. See, e.g., id. at 2359 ("Taking the claim elements separately, the function
performed by the computer at each step of the process is '[p]urely conventional."')
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298
(2012)); Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
("Taking the claim limitations separately, the function performed by the computer at
each step is purely conventional.").




service. Ignoring "conventional" claim limitations ignores the
specific. But in Mayo and one of the cases it relied upon for this
approach, Parker v. Flook, this is exactly what the Court has done,
effectively ignore claim limitations.3 82 While the Court has weakly
denied that it is ignoring claim limitations, 383 it effectively is. In
short, ignoring claim language is inappropriate, the Court's
precedent is inconsistent with respect to whether claim language
may effectively be ignored, and, unfortunately, the two-part test
encourages the practice without setting clear guidelines on how to
determine whether to ignore claim language, because the Court has
not explained how to determine whether technology is conventional.
And what does it mean for a claim to be directed to a "law of
nature," "physical phenomenon," or "abstract idea"? 384 Every claim
necessarily implements a law of nature, physical phenomenon, or
idea. They are the basic building blocks of any invention; "Only God
works from nothing." 385 Paraphrasing Justice Scalia, but in the
context of eligibility: It is misleading to say that the whole world is
embraced within these three phrases (law of nature, physical
phenomenon, and abstract idea), and then to define those phrases to
mean anything that renders a claim ineligible. "This is
382. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
383. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 n.3 ("Because the approach we made explicit in
Mayo considers all claim elements, both individually and in combination, it is
consistent with the general rule that patent claims 'must be considered as a whole."')
(quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188); Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 ("Our approach to
respondent's application is, however, not at all inconsistent with the view that a
patent claim must be considered as a whole."). The attempt in Alice to reconcile
Flook, Diehr, and Mayo is unpersuasive; the better approach, anyway, is not to
ignore claim language. The law should foreclose this possibility clearly.
384. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134-35
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It only confuses the issue, however, to
introduce such terms as 'the work of nature' and the 'laws of nature.' For these are
vague and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation.
Everything that happens may be deemed 'the work of nature,' and any patentable
composite exemplifies in its properties 'the laws of nature.' Arguments drawn from
such terms for ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed to challenge
almost every patent. On the other hand, the suggestion that 'if there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of
nature to a new and useful end' may readily validate Bond's claim.").




gobbledygook. It really is, it's irrational."38 6 In other words, what is a
law of nature? Likewise, what is a physical phenomenon? And what
is an abstract idea? The Bilski and Alice decisions addressed the last
of the three facially ineligible concepts, an abstract idea.387 Notably,
the Supreme Court struggled to identify why the claims at issue
were directed to abstract ideas. All the Court could do was
summarize its precedent and then conclude that the claim was
directed to an abstract idea. 3 88 Even worse, as already described,
only by ignoring claim limitations has the court concluded that a
claim merely describes a natural law, physical phenomenon, or
abstract idea. Particularly with respect to the abstract idea
exception, this logic is circular. It is hardly surprising that an
abstraction of the actual claim language is found to be abstract. 389
In short, the first part of the Supreme Court's test for eligibility
provides no objective guidelines. The determination of whether a
claim is "directed" to an "abstract idea," in particular, is a wholly
subjective task. One way of describing how to make this
determination is the phrase coined by Justice Stewart to describe
when pornography qualifies as obscenity: "I know it when I see it."390
And that is no way to engineer a patent system that is supposed to
provide incentives for inventors and businesses to make decisions to
invest in research and development.
B. Whether a Claim Includes an Inventive Concept
The Supreme Court's test . for eligibility also lacks
administrability, particularly with respect to the second aspect of
that test. In particular, the way that the Court has decided to
address its concerns with claim breadth and abstractness is,
ultimately, to ask whether a claim includes any inventive concept. In
Mayo, for example, the Court explained that its precedents in the
area of patent eligibility "insist that a process that focuses upon the
use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combination of
elements, sometimes referred to as an 'inventive concept,' sufficient
to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
386. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (Scalia, J.).
387. See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2009); Alice, 135 S. Ct. 2347.
388. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 (holding that the claims at issue were drawn to
an abstract idea); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (same).
389. See supra Part II.C.
390. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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than a patent upon the natural law itself."391 Likewise the Court
characterized a claim at issue in a prior case as including steps "that
in terms of patent law's objectives had significance-they
transformed the process into an inventive application." 392 In Myriad,
the Court similarly focused on its belief that "separating [a] gene
from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention."3 93
And in Alice, the Court indicated the same search for an inventive
concept is appropriate for determining, not just whether a claim
extends beyond a mere natural law, but also whether a claim is too
abstract: "[W]e must examine the elements of the claim to determine
whether it contains an inventive concept sufficient to transform the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application." 394 In all
these cases the Court is concerned that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) is issuing and courts are sustaining
claims that do not include anything "inventive."
How does one decide whether a claim includes an inventive
concept? Unfortunately, no one really knows what an inventive
concept is. 3 9 5 As with abstractness, you apparently just know an
inventive concept when you see it.396 But this should not be
surprising. The struggle with inventiveness is not new. Indeed, given
the unconstrained, unpredictable nature of the "invention"
requirement, the Patent Act of 1952 eliminated any investigation
into inventiveness in favor of the question of non-obviousness. 397 It is
like we have entered a time machine and returned to 1951.
The statutory doctrine that replaced the "invention"
requirement, and thus makes unnecessary the search for an
inventive concept, is the requirement of non-obviousness. 39 8 The
ultimate question of a claim's non-obviousness is subjective; it is not
a question of objective fact but one based at least partly on
suggestion and supposition. As highlighted above, the modern
391. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
392. Id. at 1299. See also id. (explaining that precedent found "no 'inventive
concept' in the claimed application").
393. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2117 (2013).
394. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014) (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1298).
395. See infra Part V.
396. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
397. See Rich, supra note 351, at 26 (discussing the history of § 103).
398. See supra Part I.
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approach to analyzing non-obviousness, however, includes important
objective guidelines. 3 99
Indeed, Congress expressly contemplated the problem of
subjectivity during the process leading to the enactment of the non-
obviousness requirement. In 1951, when the current statutory
approach was being considered by Congress, a commentator called
for § 103 to include a functional relationship test rather than or as
an explanation of the non-obviousness requirement.400 The argument
was that, without a functional relationship test, § 103 would put in
place a subjective test rather than an objective one. 40 1 Congress
obviously rejected the argument, and today we have what is, in the
end, a subjective non-obviousness test with objective constraints on
the analysis.402 Judge Rich later explained how helpful the objective
guidelines can be to constrain the non-obviousness analysis. Indeed,
his explanation is so helpful to understand the objective constraints
§ 103 employs that I will include the extended quotation:
"What difference does it make, it must still be a subjective
decision?" True, but now the statute provides a standard
according to which the subject of decision must be made.
There is a vast difference between basing a decision on
exercise of the inventive or creative faculty, or genius,
ingenuity, patentable novelty, flashes, surprises and
excitement, on the one hand, and basing it on unobviousness
to one of ordinary skill in the art on the other. It is possible
to determine what art is involved, what type of skills
possessed by ordinary workers in it, and come to some
conclusion as to what "ordinary skill" would be at a given
time. This may present knotty problems but it is a definite
pattern of thinking and does not leave the Patent Office or
the courts free to conclude that a thing is not patentable for
any old reason and stand on the proposition that something
indefinable and impalpable called "invention" was not
involved. At least they have to talk in terms of obviousness
to a [person] of ordinary skill in the art. While the ultimate
decision as to what his skill would be and what would be
399. See supra Part III.B.2.
400. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760 before
Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 113-49 (1951)
(statement of G. Write Arnold, Senior Member, Arnold & Mathis).
401. Id.
402. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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obvious to him is subjective, it is one definite proposition on
which evidence can be adduced.403
In other words, the statutory non-obvious requirement includes
objective constraints; the "invention" requirement did not. In
particular, to prove obviousness the scope and content of the prior
art must be identified. The level of ordinary skill in the art must be
identified. And the question of non-obviousness must be asked from
the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art. 4 04
The Supreme Court's search for an inventive concept, by
contrast, is just as subjective and unconstrained as the Supreme
Court's old "invention" requirement. The Supreme Court invokes an
unfettered subjective analysis when in Mayo it says that "the
underlying functional concern here is a relative one: how much
future innovation is foreclosed relative to the contribution of the
inventor."405 The basic problem is that the Court never explains how
to determine when the "foreclosure" of future innovation is too much.
The Court does say that its "cases have endorsed a bright-line
prohibition against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas
and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily administered
proxy for the underlying 'building-block' concern." 406 The Court's
cases, however, do not endorse any bright-line prohibition when they
exclude "abstract ideas" without any suggestion of how to determine
when an idea is too abstract and, when in the very case in which this
suggestion is made, the Court endorses a test that is based on
whether the application of a natural law is "inventive" based on
whether it adds "significantly more" or "enough"-whatever those
words mean in terms of their application. 407 In short, given the non-
obviousness requirement, the search for an inventive concept is just
as unnecessary, inappropriate, and problematic as the old
"invention" requirement.
The lack of administrability of the Supreme Court's two-part test
for eligibility is not lost on patent practitioners. 4 0 8 Consider a sample
403. Rich, supra note 90, at 406.
404. See supra text accompanying note 194 (discussing Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
405. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012).
406. Id.
407. Id. at 1294, 1297.
408. Prior to Mayo and Alice, the Supreme Court seemed to expect the Federal
Circuit to provide clearer guidelines regarding the appropriate way to determine
eligibility. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612-13 (2010) ("In disapproving an
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of comments on the affect of Mayo and Alice:
* "The fact-specific nature of post-Alice eligibility disputes
suggests a need for further guidance." 409
* "[Iln the one year since Alice has come out, district courts
have had a tough time coming to grips with what exactly
is an abstract idea and what addition qualifies as an
inventive concept." 410
* Decrying "widespread tumult and confusion surrounding
such a fundamental patent law issue."4 11
* "One year after the Alice decision, we remain in a
confusing state where validity under § 101 is unclear for
any particular software-based patent or patent
application. Of course, this confusion is not surprising, as
the Alice decision was shockingly deficient in defining
key terms such as 'abstract,' 'routine conventional
activities' and 'fundamental economic concepts."'412
* "What's unclear is how exactly to apply the so-called
Mayo second step."4 13
* 'The Alice decision did nothing to clarify the principles in
the Mayo decision, and, one year later, the consequences
of that failure have been far-reaching."414
* "One year into Alice, we still need clarity into what
'abstract' and 'significantly more' mean. This is especially
important as to how Alice is applied in patent
prosecution." 4 15
* "[Tjhere do not appear to be any objective standards in
the way § 101 rejections are handled and that § 101
rejections are often set forth without adequate
explanation. Applicants are often at the whim of the
exclusive machine-or-transformation test, we by no means foreclose the Federal
Circuit's development of other limiting criteria that further the purposes of the
Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.").
409. Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, LAW360 (Jun. 17, 2015 8:27 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice
(reporting a statement of Robert M. Barrett).
410. Id. (reporting a statement of Padmaja Chinta).
411. Id. (reporting a statement of Brian Dunne).
412. Id. (reporting a statement of Barry S. Goldsmith).
413. Id. (reporting a statement of Hiroyuki Hagiwara).
414. Id. (reporting a statement of Herbert D. Hart III).
415. Id. (reporting a statement of Steven Wong).
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particular examiner, which can lead to significant
variance and unpredictability of prosecution."4 16
The outcry for more clarity and guidance, regarding the governing
test for eligibility in particular, has been deafening. Indeed, one of
the most significant problems with the current approach to patent
eligibility is its lack of administrability. 417
V. PERVERSE IMPACT
Ironically, while the underlying policies have been confused and
the proper analysis of patent eligibility under the Supreme Court's
recent precedent lacks administrability, the result of all this
confusion is seemingly clear: the result seems to be that, when
challenged, patent applications and issued patents in certain
technology areas (software and biotechnology most prominently)
probably do not satisfy the requirement of eligibility. This is beause
of the two overarching problems with the current test governing
eligibility, the unfettered access the test provides to the smorgasbord
of supporting policies justifying different limits on patentability, and
the test's subjective nature. At least it is the perception that that
these patent applications and patents do not satisfy the requirement
of eligibility. We are not quite to the point where we could say, as
Justice Jackson quipped in the context of U.S. patent law's now-
discredited "invention" requirement, that "the only patent that is
valid is one which [the Supreme] Court has not been able to get its
hands on." 4 1 8 After all, the Supreme Court did find for the patent
owner on the issue of eligibility-at least in part-in one of the four
cases it heard in the past six years on point.419 Application of the
416. Id. (reporting a statement of Steven Wong).
417. Given the Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari in Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.-a case in which the Federal Circuit cried out for guidance-it
seemingly falls upon the Federal Circuit alone to somehow create an administrable
framework for eligibility. See Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
2511 (2016) (denying certiorari).
418. Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
419. Compare Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014)
(finding claims ineligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (same); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611-12 (2010) (same)
with Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)
(finding some claims ineligible and some claims eligible).
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Supreme Court's eligibility test by lower courts, however, has been
more stark.
A. The Impact of the Supreme Court's Recent Cases on Lower Court
Decisions
In the first year after Alice, the Supreme Court's last decision on
patent eligibility, the Federal Circuit invalidated every set of patent
claims challenged as ineligible in twelve of its thirteen opinions on
point.420 The high rate of invalidations might be explained by
pointing to incorrect decisions by patent examiners to grant these
patents. In other words, one explanation is that there has been a
clearing of the deck of patents that never should have been issued in
the first place.
Beyond the high rate, however, consider one of the most shocking
examples of invalidations based on the Supreme Court's two-part
test of ineligibility. Indeed, perhaps the best example of how far the
Supreme Court went off the rails, at least in terms of putting in
place a test that causes an absurd result, is the case of Ariosa v.
Sequenom.421 The patent at issue in the case covered a new method
for "prenatal diagnosis of fetal DNA that avoids the risks of widely-
used techniques that took samples from the fetus or placenta." 422 In
particular, the inventors "discovered cell-free fetal DNA ('cffDNA) in
maternal plasma and serum, the portion of maternal blood samples
that other researchers had previously discarded as medical
waste."4 2 3 Given that cffDNA can be used to determine fetal
characteristics, such as gender and Down's Syndrome, the inventors
"implemented a method for detecting the small fraction of paternally
inherited cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum."424 This novel, non-
obvious process had significant medical benefits given both the
ability of doctors to make prenatal diagnoses as well as the non-
invasive nature of the process. 42 5
The Federal Circuit, however, affirmed a finding of invalidity of
the claims at issue under the Supreme Court's two-part test from
420. See supra note 20. Even in the lone exception, DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal Circuit judges
split 2-1. Id. at 1263-66 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
421. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
422. Id. at 1373.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. See id. at 1376.
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Mayo. Applying the first part of the test, the court noted that "[it] is
undisputed that the existence of cffDNA in maternal blood is a
natural phenomenon." 426 The court then held that "[t]he method ...
begins and ends with a natural phenomenon. Thus, the claims are
directed to matter that is naturally occurring." 427 Applying the
second part of the test, the court "conclude[d] that the practice of the
method claims does not result in an inventive concept that
transforms the natural phenomenon of cffDNA into a patentable
invention." 428 On this point, the Federal Circuit cited Supreme Court
precedent for the proposition that "process claims encompass[ing]
natural phenomena" must include steps beyond the natural law that
are "new and useful."4 2 9 Unfortunately for the patent owner, the
additional steps in the claims beyond those describing the newly-
discovered natural phenomena were not new; they were "well-
understood, routine, and conventional activity." 430 As a result, the
Federal Circuit held the claims invalid as ineligible. 43 1
Judge Linn's concurring opinion focused on the absurdity of the
holding. He joined the court's opinion only because he felt "bound by
the sweeping language of the test set out in Mayo." 432 He pointed out
that "the breadth of the second part of the test was unnecessary to
the decision reached in Mayo."4 33 In more detail, Judge Linn's
problem with the second part of the test was that it represented a
"blanket dismissal of conventional post-solution steps."4 34 In his own
words, "[t]his case represents the consequence-perhaps
unintended-of that broad language in excluding a meritorious
invention from the patent protection it deserves and should have
been entitled to retain."435 He pointed out that the invention here
eliminated the need for invasive measures and their attendant risks
to mothers and pregnancies, reduced the time and expensive
equipment necessary to make prenatal diagnoses, and increased
accuracy of those diagnoses. 436 He cited evidence that the invention




429. Id. at 1377.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 1380.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1381.
435. Id. at 1380.
436. Id. at 1381.
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represented "a paradigm shift in non-invasive prenatal diagnosis,"
and had been introduced successfully into the market by the
inventors.437 Importantly, he restated the traditional legal reason
the claims should be found to be eligible: "Sequenom 'effectuate[d] a
practical result and benefit not previously attained,' so its patent
would traditionally have been valid." 4 38 He concluded his opinion by
remarking: "But for the sweeping language in the Supreme Court's
Mayo opinion, I see no reason, in policy or statute, why this
breakthrough invention should be deemed patent ineligible." 439
Judge Linn's focus on the fact that the claimed invention
"effectuated a practical result and benefit not previously attained"
demonstrates the appropriate application of the subject matter and
utility requirements, the two patentability requirements that
collectively form the eligibility requirement of § 101. Sequenom's
claimed invention meets the subject matter requirement because the
claims at issue describe processes that include steps that were
created by or are the result of human effort. Claim 1, for example,
requires "amplifying a paternally inherited nucleic acid from the
serum or plasma sample" and "detecting the presence of a paternally
inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin in the sample."440 Regardless of
whether these process steps were conventional, they represent
human effort, and thus satisfy the subject matter requirement.
Likewise the claimed invention meets the utility requirement
because the inventors disclosed in their patent specification practical
applications of the newly-discovered natural phenomenon. Claim 1,
for example, describes "detecting the presence of a paternally
inherited nucleic acid of fetal origin in the sample,"4 41 and the
specification describes the benefits of this particular step of the
claimed invention as allowing for non-invasive prenatal (1) sex
determination and (2) detection of paternally-inherited diseases,
including Down's Syndrome. 44 2 It is the combination of the subject
437. Id.
438. Id. (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1859) (quoting Househill
Coal & Iron Co. v. Neilson, Webster's Patent Case 673, 683 (House of Lords 1843));
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (same); Lefstin, supra note 120).
439. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1381.
440. Id. at 1374 (reciting limitations from Claim 1 ofU.S. Patent No. 6,258,540).
441. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540, col. 23, 11. 60-67.
442. Id. at col. 4, 1. 19-col. 5, 1. 53 (sex determination); col. 3, 11. 25-52 (Down's




matter and utility requirements that effectively screens claimed
inventions for eligibility." 8
Another case illustrating how off the rails the eligibility analysis
has gone is Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States.444 In this case, the
Court of Federal Claims concluded that the claim at issue was
ineligible for patenting because it was directed to an abstract idea,
despite the facts that (1) the claimed invention was a system that
included limitations requiring sensors to be mounted on an object
and a reference frame; and (2) the claimed invention involved
determining an orientation of an object relative to a moving
reference frame based on signals received from the sensors." 5 The
court, applying the first part of the two-part test of Alice, concluded
that "the claims are directed to the abstract idea of tracking two
moving objects, and incorporate laws of nature governing motion,
both of which are ineligible for patent protection." 446 Then, applying
the second part of the two-part test, decided that "[a]lthough the
concept of tracking the motion of a moving object relative to a
moving reference frame may have been novel and nonobvious, the
claimed system does nothing to ground this abstract idea in a
specific way."" 7
The court's analysis represents just how far courts have strayed
from analyzing patents using traditional patentability and
specification requirements. Indeed, any problem with respect to the
claim at issue in Thales Visionix in truth had nothing to do with
ineligibility. The alleged problem-that the claimed system did not
"ground this abstract idea in a specific way"-related to the fact that
the claim itself did not include the particular algorithm to determine
the orientation of the object. Thus, the alleged problem should have
been addressed using the enablement requirement, which would
have asked whether the specification provided enabling support for
443. The combination of these requirements eliminates the eligibility of claims to
mathematical equations or expressions of relationships. Take as a first example a
claim to an equation, for example Albert Einstein's theory of special relativity, E =
mc2. Besides failing to fall into any subject matter category listed in § 101, such a
claim fails to involve any human effort. As a second example consider a claim to
making a calculation using the equation and printing the result of the calculation.
While now the claim is to an enumerated category (a process) and involves human
effort (making the calculation and printing the result of the calculation), the claimed
invention does not have any practical utility.
444. Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 245 (Fed. Cl. 2015).
445. See id. at 249.
446. Id. at 252.
447. Id. at 253.
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the full scope of the claim. The claim at issue, moreover, may have
been subject to analysis using § 112(f), given that the limitation at
issue ("an element. . . configured to determine an orientation of the
object relative to the moving reference frame based on the signals
received from the first and second inertial sensors") arguably
represents a means-plus-function limitation. Relatedly, any such
means-plus-function limitation may have been indefinite pursuant
to § 112(b). Thus, this case highlights how courts have extended the
Alice test unnecessarily to invalidate patent claims without using
the well-developed, objective tests provided by traditional patent law
doctrines.
B. Reduced Incentives to Invest in Research and Development
Given the expansive application of the Supreme Court's test to
invalidate claims like those in Ariosa in particular, a resulting
concern is that the current environment substantially reduces
incentives to invest in research and development, particularly in the
biotechnology and software technology areas. If the prevailing
perception is that, because of the eligibility requirement, patents
will not be available to protect inventions, individuals and
companies may not invest efficiently in research and development.
And this is the prevailing perception.
Consider, first, the views of some of the former leaders of the
very government institutions Congress created to create the
appropriate incentives for invention, the Federal Circuit and the
USPTO. Paul Michel, a former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit,
has expressed dismay with the Supreme Court's approach and its
effect on inventors and investors. He has explained, in particular,
that '[a]bstractness' is a vague and subjective notion that has
proven entirely unworkable, and unavoidably yields inconsistent and
unpredictable results" for all involved, including examiners, judges,
and patent attorneys, as well as the "inventors, business leaders,
and investors who need to interpret the law when making decisions
about investing in patents."4 48 Likewise, David Kappos, a former
Director of the USPTO, has criticized the Supreme Court's recent
decisions precisely because of a "risk to innovation: that [the Court's
recent] discriminatory jurisprudence will lead to a lack of faith in the
patent system's ability to protect certain categories of innovation,
sapping investment in the very fields that hold the most promise of
448. Brief of Amicus Curiae Paul R. Michel in Support of Neither Party, Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 12-298), 2014 WL 295767.
240 [Vol. 84.157
CONFUSING PATENT ELIGIBILITY
propelling us toward the exciting discoveries of tomorrow." 449 As he
explained, "[w]hen courts and the USPTO take the 'I know it when I
see it' approach to Section 101 jurisprudence, businesspeople,
investors and innovators will allocate resources away from
innovation in those industries that are perceived to fall on the wrong
side of the fence." 450 As another example from the USPTO, Robert
Stoll, a former Commissioner of the USPTO, has stated that the
Supreme Court's approach "will drive investment into research in
these technologies to other areas. We will lose our edge in the world
and many further valuable contributions to science will not come to
fruition."4 5 '
Also consider the views of active Federal Circuit judges who,
given their inferior status relative to the Supreme Court, seem less
likely to comment negatively on the Supreme Court's approach. We
have already seen that Judge Linn has expressed dismay with the
Supreme Court's two-part test for eligibility. 452 He would focus on
the presence or absence of a "practical result and benefit not
previously attained." 453 Judges Lourie and Moore have likewise
expressed the view that the Supreme Court's two-part test
incorrectly excludes certain claims from patent eligibility.4 54 They
would (1) exclude exact statements of natural laws but not "methods
that utilize laws of nature" or "actual" and "practical uses" of
449. David Kappos, Over-Reliance on Section 101 Puts Innovation at Risk,
LAW.COM (May 7, 2015), http://www.law.com/sites/lawcomteam/2015/05/07/over-
reliance-on-section-101-threatens-innovation/?s1return=20150704135508.
450. Id.
451. Robert L. Stoll, Courts are making bad patent law, THE HILL (Jul. 16, 2015),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/248054-courts-are-making-bad-
patent-law. See also Gene Quinn, A Patent Eligibility in Crisis: A Conversation with
Bob Stoll, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/10/10/a-
patent-elgibility-in-crisis-a-conversation-with-bob-stol1/id=51616 ("I think we are in
a very confusing state at the moment. I think that the courts are actually
undermining patent eligibility in many different areas.").
452. See supra text accompanying notes 432-443.
453. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
454. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for en banc rehearing) ("In
sum, it is unsound to have a rule that takes inventions of this nature out of the
realm of patent-eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural phenomenon
plus conventional steps, or that they claim abstract concepts. But I agree that the
panel did not err in its conclusion that under Supreme Court precedent it had no
option other than to affirm the district court.") (joined by Moore, J.).
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physical phenomena; 455 and (2) exclude "essentially mental steps"
but not methods including "physical, and not insignificant, steps
requiring human intervention."456 Finally, Judge Newman, while
taking the unique position among all of the Federal Circuit judges
that the Supreme Court's precedent does not prohibit the correct test
for eligibility, would similarly ask whether "science is put to
practical use."45 7 These judges have thus coalesced around the idea
that patent eligibility merely requires a practical application of a
natural law, physical phenomena, or idea.
What is perhaps just as remarkable is that Judge Dyk-with
Judge Mayer, one of the only Federal Circuit judges to indicate
something positive about Mayo and Alice-even thinks that the
Supreme Court's two-part test for eligibility is wrong as a matter of
policy. 4 5 8 He sums up the policy concern of all of these judges, at
least in the context of biotechnology:
I share the concerns of some of my colleagues that a too
restrictive test for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101
with respect to laws of nature (reflected in some of the
language in Mayo) may discourage development and
disclosure of new diagnostic and therapeutic methods in the
life sciences, which are often driven by discovery of new
natural laws and phenomena.
As exemplified by Judge Dyk, the disagreement of these Federal
Circuit judges with the Supreme Court's two-part test for eligibility
is rooted in concern with the very purpose of the patent system-the
455. See id. at 1286.
456. Id. at 1285-86.
457. Id. at 1293 (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing)
("I agree with my colleagues that this case is wrongly decided. However, I do not
share their view that this incorrect decision is required by Supreme Court
precedent.... In Mayo ... the Court recognized the principle that patent eligibility
is not disabled when science is put to practical use.").
458. See id. at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing) ("In
my view the framework of Mayo and Alice is an essential ingredient of a healthy
patent system, allowing the invalidation of improperly issued and highly
anticompetitive patents without the need for protracted and expensive litigation. Yet
I share the concerns of some of my colleagues that a too restrictive test for patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with respect to laws of nature (reflected in some of
the language in Mayo) may discourage development and disclosure of new diagnostic
and therapeutic methods in the life sciences, which are often driven by discovery of
new natural laws and phenomena.").
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encouragement of investment in research and development,
resulting in the identification and disclosure of new and useful
applications of natural laws, physical phenomena, and ideas.
Beyond these former and current leaders of the Federal Circuit
and USPTO, numerous patent practitioners have expressed similar
views concerning the effect of the Supreme Court's approach in Mayo
and Alice on investment in research and development:
"If Alice is applied as it has been, then investors may
well take a step back and wonder what the point is of
investing in new software innovations. . . . Without the
ability to patent their inventions, such developers will
necessarily retreat to trade secret protection. The end
result will be a dramatic reduction in information
sharing, publication and cooperation. Funding sources
will also dry up as investors who already struggle with
patents will find valuing a trade secret portfolio
(discounted by the problems in protecting and scaling
such businesses) impossible to sell to their investment
committees." 459
* "[T]he value of, and investment in, first mover companies
in the software and business method arts will continue to
decrease." 460
* "Perhaps many who believe that the patent system
stifles innovation or denies access to basic discoveries
celebrate this trend. However, many others who work in
high technology industries are confronted with
uncertainty that only serves to dampen the substantial
investments needed to develop new technologies."4 6 1
* "Will investors continue to be as willing to take a chance
on early stage innovators that are expecting to protect
their innovations with patents? Only time will tell."4 6 2
459. Chris Donegan, Alice in patent land: investment strategy in a post-Alice
world, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/1ibrary/
detail.aspx?g-47df823c- 1251-4ffe-a21c-ce2bf4ae3789.
460. Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, LAW360 (Jun. 17, 2015 8:27 PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-stand-one-year-after-alice
(reporting a statement of Richard Baker).
461. Id. (reporting a statement of David L. Suter).
462. Id. (reporting a statement of Jaime A. Siegel).
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Each of these quotations highlights a perception that the Supreme
Court's approach to the question of patent eligibility has had a
negative effect on investment in research and development.
Given the confusion, lack of administrability, and risk of reduced
investment in research and development-particularly given the
invalidation of an invention so clearly meritorious as the one in
Ariosa-I come to a similar conclusion as Bernard Chao: "With the
[USPTO] rejecting applications on potentially life-saving inventions,
it is time to reconsider what should and should not be patent-
eligible. Many inventions that use laws of nature, natural
phenomena and abstract ideas should still be patentable."463
Congress should amend the patent statute to eliminate the current
crisis.
CONCLUSION
Shortly after enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, Dean O.S.
Colclough of the George Washington School of Law stated that the
patent law community (patent law practitioners, professors, and
leaders of the relevant government agencies) ought to be vigilant
that courts might confuse patent law.4 6 4 In 1953, he cautioned that
"the same problems of keeping debris from collecting around the law
faces us today as faced us before the 1952 Act. And with old debris
cleared away there is more room for new debris to collect."465 He
"emphasize[d] the necessity for maintaining a high order of vigilance
so that the law will not re-collect the granite-like ... incrustations of
a type which statutes have a habit of forming about themselves
when the people do not understand or are no longer concerned with
adequate understanding of them."4 6 6 "[O]ur basic problem to further
improve, to understand, to teach, to guard and preserve the system
is still with us."4 67 New debris (the two-part test put forward in
Mayo) and granite-like incrustations (consider the Court's doubling
down on that test in Alice) have collected as a result of the Supreme
Court's recent treatment of the law governing patent eligibility,
treatment that reflects a lack of understanding of the relevant
463. Bernard Chao, USPTO Is Rejecting Potentially Life-Saving Inventions,
LAW360 (Dec. 18, 2014, 11:05 AM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/604808/uspto-is-
rejecting-potentially-life-saving-inventions.
464. See O.S. Colclough, A New Patent Act-But the Same Basic Problems, 35 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 501, 511 (1953).
465. Id. at 508.
466. Id. at 510.
467. Id. at 511.
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statutory provisions, precedent, and policies already undergirding
the patent statute. As a result, the time has come, like in 1952, to
clear away the debris; the time has come for Congress to amend the
patent statute to resolve the present crisis of confusion.

